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ABSTRACT 
 
In the past two decades the European Court of Human Rights has gone from observing 
near-perfect compliance of member states with its judgments, to a “compliance crisis,” 
whereby the number of cases remaining under their supervision for having not been 
implemented is reaching a breaking point. This paper seeks to answer the question of what 
conditions make compliance with these judgments more or less likely, utilizing Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) to identify pathways / combinations of conditions which may 
predict compliance or noncompliance. In doing so this author also seeks to address the Council 
of Europe’s mission of promoting normative consensus, and hypothesizes that a lack of 
domestic acceptance of human rights norms decreases the likelihood of compliance. The 
resulting QCA regressions instead point to the importance of a country’s categorization as a 
liberal democracy and status as a founding member of the Council of Europe, while also 
assigning predictive power to the domestic acceptance of human rights norms. 
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“Since 1989-1990 the enlargement of the Council of Europe has created a new dimension for 
the operation of the Convention system […] The major challenge for the Court today is not 
only to maintain and develop the Convention standards but also to ensure that the Europe of 
human rights remains a single entity with common values.” – Evaluation Group Report1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE or the Council) brings together 47 countries from across 
the European continent, including the 28 European Union countries but also nearly every other 
country from the region, including post-Soviet states and Turkey, with the aim of promoting 
democracy, human rights, and rule of law.2 Its human rights treaty, the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), bases its legitimacy on a common “European consensus,” whereby 
those states in the Council are able to codify norms of customary international law according 
to their shared values.3 This was emphasized by the former secretary-general of the Council of 
Europe, Walter Schwimmer, who envisioned “a European community of values that would 
extend beyond political and economic interests to foster cultural diversity, including tolerance 
and mutual respect.”4 This vision is not yet a reality, however, as the ECHR at the moment 
only protects fundamental civil and political rights; social and economic rights have 
specifically been excluded due to a lack of consensus amongst its member states. 5 
The European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) is the key judicial organ 
responsible for interpreting and propagating this consensus. Despite being established in 1959, 
it was not until 1998 that it functioned on a full-time basis, accepting applications from 
individuals across all of its member states.6 In recent years the number of cases against states’ 
observance of human rights norms being brought in front of the Court has greatly increased, 
and its backlog continues to grow. At the same time, the Council is facing a crisis regarding 
the rate at which member states actually comply with the court's rulings.7 Many analysts note 
that this “compliance crisis” has corresponded with the expansion of the CoE to include twenty-
four countries from the former Soviet bloc,8 raising the question of whether there is effectively 
                                                 
1 Evaluation Group 2001  
2 Council of Europe 2012  
3 Dzehtsiarou 2011 
4 Jordan 2003 
5 Moravcsik 1995, p. 169 
6 European Court of Human Rights Public Relations (ND), “The Court in Brief” 
7 De Vries 2015 
8 Mahoney 2002, Jordan 2003 
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a "European consensus" on these matters. Non-compliance could be caused by a variety of 
inter-related factors, but it is unclear which set of state characteristics makes compliance more 
or less likely. This paper seeks to investigate whether there is any linkage between the current 
compliance crisis and the presence of normative division within the CoE. Or in other words, to 
what extent is the lack of compliance with ECtHR rulings caused by a lack of domestic 
acceptance of human rights norms?  
 
Why Examine Compliance? 
Compliance with international institutions is a relatively new area of research within 
the social sciences, having emerged in conjunction with the spread of international institutions 
in the latter half of the 20th century.9 It is seen as a puzzle that states would willingly submit 
their authority and sovereignty to an international institution in the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms.10 This is especially true for the ECtHR, which has even fewer means of 
enforcement than other international judicial institutions, such as the ICC, ICJ, ECJ, or 
IACHR.11 
Thus compliance with the ECtHR has been a growing area of study, particularly in 
recent years in response to the 
growing caseload and increased rate 
of non-compliance amongst member 
states. Although high rates of 
compliance with an institution that 
lacks enforcement mechanisms may 
intuitively seem unlikely, until 2007 
the Court observed almost perfect 
compliance, according to the 
Council’s annual report on the 
execution of ECtHR judgments.12 
Yet in 2008 “the number of leading 
cases pending before the Committee 
of Ministers (CoM) [meaning cases in which states have yet to comply] between two and five 
                                                 
9 Koh 1997 
10 Çalı,, Koch, and Bruch 2013 
11 Hillebrecht 2009 
12 Chavez and Follesdal 2013  
 
Figure 1: Length of Time for Implementation of ECtHR judgments 
Source:  Hervey 2017 
P A G E  | 7 
 
years was 35%, in 2009 the number was 49%, and in 2010 it was 51%.”13 In the years since 
this trend has continued, as Figure 1 illustrates.14 This has led numerous scholars and 
policymakers to speculate at what lies at the root of this growing trend of noncompliance. 
In this thesis I aim to address this question through analyzing a set of possible 
conditions and pathways leading toward compliance with judgments from the European Court 
of Human Rights. In the first section, I will outline previous approaches toward investigating 
this question. This includes an examination of both broad theoretical approaches and the work 
of several authors who have attempted to answer these questions, as well as a discussion on the 
gaps in their analyses related to normative motivations behind states’ actions. I next provide an 
overview of the dataset I have built to analyze 55 cases brought before the Court, using 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to identify the pathways and conditions leading to 
compliance. Building on the existing literature and my own analysis, I hypothesize that among 
the many pathways which could lead to compliance, domestic acceptance of human rights 
norms is a necessary condition for compliance to occur. This would indicate that the normative 
consensus upon which the CoE bases its legitimacy is lacking, and that a new approach toward 
understanding the role of the Council as a human rights scheme is needed. 
 
  
                                                 
13 Chavez and Follesdal 2013  
14 For another depiction of this crisis, see Figure 1A in the appendix. 
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THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE 
 
Before examining compliance with the ECtHR, it is first necessary to define 
‘compliance’ as it will be used in this project, in accordance with its understanding in 
international law. Compliance with international organizations is a concept that has been 
heavily discussed but rarely empirically studied. And since most researchers have different 
definitions on what compliance is, it remains a term rooted in differing theoretical paradigms.15 
This project will follow the custom of most studies on the ECtHR, using the words 
“compliance” and “implementation” interchangeably, as “intrinsically linked manifestations of 
state responses to human rights law.”16 As a theoretical concept, there are many different 
approaches toward compliance, with theories arising primarily from the fields of political 
science and public choice. These generally may be categorized into one of two theoretical 
camps: materialist-rationalist or ideational-sociological (also sometimes labeled 
constructivist).17 As is the case when discussing theory, both broad schools of thought 
contribute different equally valuable explanations for why states behave the way they do, and 
may be seen as complementary in their approaches.18 Table 1 illustrates in detail the different 
levels of analysis which the two theoretical paradigms typically employ, categorized according 
to international/regional, domestic, and domestic-international interaction levels. Power and 
self-interest are the domain of materialist-rationalist approaches, while the influence of norms 
is examined in ideational-sociological theories. 
Table 1: Existing Approaches Explaining the Influence of International Human Rights Pressure on State Behavior 
 
Source: Cardenas 2004, p. 215 
                                                 
15 Guzman 2002 
16 Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi 2014, p. 211 
17 Cardenas 2004, p. 214 
18 Von Staden 2012 
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As seen in Table 1, materialist-rationalist approaches emphasize the role of power and 
self-interest in states’ logical reasoning, arguing that states will comply if there is some clear 
benefit for them arising from their adherence to the Court’s judgments. Materialist-rationalist 
approaches typically focus on hegemony, sanctions, incentives, and material self-interest, 
including reputational concerns.19 This may also be characterized as a focus on the push factors 
which motivate compliance. One common argument found in this perspective is that 
international institutions are used as a tool by strong governments to coerce their weaker 
counterparts to adopt obligations, for instance through military intervention or sanctions.20 
Another is that compliance is motivated by states seeking to bolster their reputational power, 
elevating their position on the global stage.21 In the majority of these approaches, human rights 
violations are expected to be pervasive, “given that it is not in most states’ material interests to 
attach sufficiently high costs to noncompliance.”22 
However, it is clear these rationalist theories cannot entirely explain state compliance, 
particularly the high rate which is observed at the ECtHR. Thus while materialist-rationalist 
theories may be illustrative for examining why states initially sign treaties and make efforts to 
appear as though they are normatively aligned with the international community, most authors 
combine materialist-rationalist theories with those in the ideational-sociological camp in order 
to discuss compliance with the ECtHR. For instance, as Beach discusses in his piece comparing 
utilitarian and normative theories of compliance, domestic legal systems demonstrate the 
normative power of law which extends beyond mere rational reasoning. Actors do not merely 
choose not to rob banks because of the threat of jail, but also “because we are socialized to 
believe that bank robbing is an ‘immoral’ and ‘illegal’ action.”23 This example plays out time 
and time again when examining international legal systems, and Beach thus argues for building 
an integrative compliance model that includes a normative element of internalized social 
practices.24 His analysis is based on the ECJ, however, which has significant enforcement 
mechanisms; therefore, an analysis of the ECtHR requires even more examination of the 
normative construction of compliance.  
This then leads us to the other theoretical end of the spectrum, where ideational-
sociological (or constructivist) theories on international law emphasize the interaction between 
                                                 
19 Bates 2015, p. 1170 
20 Elvy 2012, p. 81 
21 Guzman 2002 
22 Elvy 2012, p. 81 
23 Beach 2006, p. 122 
24 Ibid. 
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domestic and international courts as the impetus for norm development and diffusion, which 
then leads to compliance.25 In contrast to materialist-rationalist theories, this perspective 
emphasizes the pull factor of institutions such as human rights norms, and argues that “repeated 
interactions, argumentation, and exposure to norms characterize and construct state practice.”26 
According to the Chayes’, “the fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance with 
treaties at an acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty 
organization, and the wider public.”27 And as Beach discusses, a social institution such as the 
Council of Europe, at the time its creation, “naturally reflects the instrumental interests of 
actors, but over time, through actor participation and interaction with the legal system, 
compliance becomes an internalized social practice that makes normative prescriptions for 
acceptable behavior.”28 This theoretical paradigm may be traced both at the domestic level, 
where the activity of civil society has sometimes been used to measure the local resonance and 
perceived legitimacy of international norms, and at the international level, where international 
law may be seen as the codification of an international normative environment. As Cardenas 
notes, this latter level of analysis demonstrates how “the impact human rights can have depends 
on the strength of international norms.” 29 
From a theoretical perspective, this paper assumes that compliance will be most likely 
when there is a combination of rationalist and normative motivations, both push and pull 
factors, in favor of compliance. Materialist-rationalist push factors toward compliance are more 
commonly studied, as they are both more visible and comparatively straightforward. The pull 
factor of normative alignment, on the other hand, is more abstract and difficult to trace, and 
thus has rarely been studied.30 In the hopes of adding to the existing literature on compliance, 
this paper seeks to add an empirical assessment of the Council of Europe’s “normative 
consensus.” This follows from domestic-level ideational-sociological theory, in which it is 
understood that: 
“human rights reform depends on internal acceptance of international norms. Scholars 
working in this tradition, therefore, expect international pressure to be most influential 
when a ‘cultural match’ or ‘normative fit’ exists […] That is, human rights reform 
occurs when international and domestic norms converge.” 31   
                                                 
25 Cutler 2017, p. 136 and Hafner-Burton et al p. 54 
26 Bates 2015, p. 1170  
27 Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes, qtd. in Koh 1997, p. 2601 
28 Beach 2006, p. 123 
29 Cardenas 2004 
30 Verdier and Voeten 2015 
31 Cardenas 2004, p. 216 
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This subset of ideational-sociological theory thus demonstrates the theoretical paradox 
present in rates of compliance with the ECtHR: if states are socialized toward accepting human 
rights norms through their interaction in the Council of Europe, then why are rates of 
compliance, addressing human rights violations, dropping? As I suggest and this project seeks 
to measure, it could be that rather than inherently promote “normative consensus,” the CoE is 
struggling to bind together states which lack that “cultural match” or “normative fit,” and that 
this struggle may be traced in the dropping rates of compliance with the Court.  
 In doing so, this project does not attempt to test whether one or the other of these 
theories is “better” at explaining the prevalence of non-compliance. Following the approach of 
previous authors, which will be discussed in the next section, it is expected that a combination 
of the two will most accurately describe the conditions which lead to compliance or a lack 
thereof.  In light of this theoretical framework, this project will attempt to illustrate the 
interaction between the two schools of thought by examining which combinations of conditions 
lead to a particular outcome, with a particular focus on the possible role which normative 
consensus (or the lack thereof) may play. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A number of authors have attempted to empirically test the validity of these differing 
theories of compliance, typically using courts such as the ECtHR, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACHR), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), or other human rights tribunals 
as their subjects of study. It may seem intuitive that there are differences between different 
states’ levels of compliance with judgments from the ECtHR. The puzzle is not that there are 
differences, but rather what background factors may account for these differences. For instance, 
Voeten and Grewal recently demonstrated that new democracies tend to achieve compliance 
more quickly than established democracies, but it remains unclear what factors lead to this 
trend.32 Meanwhile many authors discuss the democratic deficit of the Court as a reason for 
non-compliance; if member states do not believe that the rulings of the Court are legitimate 
exercises of its power, or distrust its authority, they may be less likely to implement their 
judgments.33 Other authors focus on domestic factors, such as political machinations or lack of 
financial resources to properly implement ECtHR obligations.  
In the following section I will briefly review several studies on states’ differing levels 
of compliance which are fundamental to this study, focusing on those which relate to the 
Council of Europe. To do so I will first provide an overview of the predominant rationalist-
materialist explanations for why states comply with the ECtHR, followed by a brief 
examination of the existing literature on ideational-sociological studies. From this overview I 
will then review the two authors I have selected whose work best exemplifies the attempt to 
merge rationalist-materialist and ideational-sociological theories into their research. In the final 
part of this section I will then draw the reader’s attention to the major gaps still to be addressed 
in this field, and explain the intended contribution of this project to the existing literature.  
  
Materialist-Rationalist Explanations 
As discussed in the previous chapter, materialist-rationalist approaches tend to focus on 
the push factors toward compliance with international institutions, highlighting the role of 
coercion, hegemony, regime type, politics, and power. Much of the literature on differing rates 
of compliance with the ECtHR has focused on one of three main explanatory factors, which I 
                                                 
32 Grewal and Voeten 2015 
33 Bellamy 2015, Slaughter 1995  
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will briefly discuss in this section. These comprise measurement inconsistency, rationalist logic 
for membership with the CoE, and the continuation of Cold-War power struggles. 
From a purely rationalist perspective, this difference in observed rates of compliance 
could be easily explained be due to a lack of consistency in the Court’s measurement standards 
or an abundancy of optimism in their previous assumptions. For instance, previous researchers 
have failed to find solid data supporting the claims of near-perfect compliance in the Court’s 
earlier years. Their findings do hint that perhaps it was not as high as reported, as for instance 
the Court’s Survey of Activities once suggested that “compliance with ECHR judgments (as 
measured by domestic law adjustment in the wake of an adverse decision) hovered around 64 
percent between 1960 and 1995”34 This is also related to a change in the CoM’s interpretation 
of their supervisory duties, a role which is outlined in Article 46 of the ECHR.35 In the early 
days of the Court, the CoM is said to have discharged its duties in a very hands-off manner.36 
Early Court documents demonstrate their lack of strict supervision, including a number of 
occasions in which the CoM accepted a state's promise not to repeat the violation as sufficient 
for them to terminate their supervision of the case.37 Over time this practice evolved, starting 
in the mid-1980s when they clarified their supervisory role and began to require evidence of 
changes implemented before they would publish final resolutions. In the 1990s the CoM has 
been assisted in their expanded supervisory role by the Directorate General of Human Rights 
and Rule of Law and its specialized Department for the Execution of the Judgments of the 
ECtHR. This Department maintains an online database of cases, including the status of states' 
execution of their obligations, categorizing cases as pending or closed, and its involvement 
mitigates the political entanglement of the Committee of Ministers, which is comprised of 
politicians from each of the member states, each with their own political agendas. Therefore 
the Committee's supervision has "become quite rigorous", and as Von Staden discusses, "the 
standards that the Committee has come to apply set thresholds sufficiently high so as to make 
the Committee's final resolutions a reasonably reliable indicator of compliance with the 
ECtHR's judgments." So could the change in rates of compliance simply be that the CoM is 
now employing more rigorous measurement standards? 
An alternate materialist-rationalist approach toward the issue of compliance calls for an 
examination of motivations for membership in the Council of Europe and the demonstration of 
                                                 
34 Hawkins and Jacoby 2008, p. 13 
35 Council of Europe 1950  
36 Von Staden 2012 
37 Von Staden 2018  
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adherence to the ECHR. Why would a state sign the ECHR in the first place, if they then do 
not intend to comply? This issue is not unique to the CoE; it is inherent to all discourse on 
international institutions. However the Council is a particularly interesting case since, as 
mentioned previously, more so than other regional integration schemes it lacks any kind of 
enforcement mechanisms or coercive powers, and its mandate is limited to promoting 
democracy, rule of law, and human rights.38 There therefore are few direct material benefits 
from membership in this institution and few costs to non-compliance.39 However one potential 
material benefit arising from membership in the Council is a facilitated process toward 
membership in other more prestigious groups, such as the European Union or NATO.40 This 
extends to their compliance as well, as those member states of the CoE which wish to join the 
EU must satisfy the Council that they are generally in compliance with the ECHR.41 
Additionally, in comparison to the entry requirements for many other regional institutions, the 
barrier for entry to the Council is rather low. It is therefore not an overly cumbersome process 
to seek membership, and its benefits include a boost in a country’s reputational power and 
perceived legitimacy: something many post-Soviet states and new democracies seeking 
international recognition highly value.42 There may also be the desire to be a part of the regional 
socialization scheme which regional institutions represent, to hold influence within the 
conversation on developing human rights.43  
A final explanation for differing rates of compliances arises from materialist-rationalist 
theory relates to the continued power struggles of the Cold War, transposed into an “East-West 
Divide” within the Council of Europe. This argument was particularly popular during the late 
1990s, when the largest expansion of the Council took place, incorporating 21 states from the 
former Soviet bloc.44 This also demonstrates the need for a distinction between the reasons 
states sought membership in the Council during its early years and the reasons behind the more 
recent members’ joining. When the Council was first developing, it represented the only truly 
pan-European regional institution and a crucial neutral ground for rebuilding Europe, albeit 
                                                 
38 Jordan 2003 
39 See for instance the debate on whether Belarus should join or not, examined in Smok 2015. “More important, 
they want full access to the Council of Europe's lobby, meeting rooms, and microphones, which can act as a 
powerful tool for promoting the government's views among European parliamentarians and other officials.” 
40 Jordan 2003 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Slaughter 1995 
44 Jordan 2003 
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only in a cultural and legal sense. 45 During the late 1980s the democratization in the East and 
the opening up of membership to former Soviet countries brought the Council into a new 
political role, which it has characterized as “a political anchor and human rights watchdog for 
Europe’s post-communist democracies.”46 Many within the Council believed that the accession 
of new members would persuade them to adopt similar human rights standards and liberal 
democratic practices, “out of an agreed notion of what an expanded European identity is.”47 
However, since then many have questioned whether it has been successful in this role, or 
whether the attempt to build consensus between these two groups of countries has crippled the 
Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy.48  
Changes in the Council’s standards of measurement or interpretation of its role, material 
benefits for some states of entry into the CoE, or continued Cold War mentalities are crucial 
considerations when discussing compliance with the ECtHR. Yet they do not explain why some 
states have consistently higher rates of compliance than others, or why the average length of 
time for a domestic court to implement a judgment has increased. They also cannot account for 
outliers such as Latvia, a post-Soviet state which entered the EU quite early, which has 
remarkably high rates of compliance, or Turkey which has a strong desire to join the EU but is 
among those states with the most cases still listed as pending. We therefore turn next to an 
examination of explanations derived from ideational-sociological theories. 
 
Ideational-Sociological Literature 
Goodman and Jinks in Socializing States bemoan that “compliance theorists to date 
have focused on material inducement and persuasion while neglecting a third mechanism of 
‘acculturation’: cognitive and social pressures to conform to an in-group.”49 This is 
unfortunately particularly true in the case of the ECtHR; there has been relatively little in the 
way of empirical research testing ideational-sociological theories of compliance, a gap which 
is unsurprising given the abstract nature of norm development. More generally speaking, some 
authors have sought to examine these theories through discussing the development of 
customary international law, which is intrinsically related to the widespread domestic 
acceptance of international norms. However debates regarding the nature, definition, and 
                                                 
45 Kennedy and O’Halpin 2000, p. 131 
46 “Speech of Prof. Cornel Codita” 2014  
47 Jordan 2003, p. 665  
48 Aldershoff 2017 
49 Goodman and Jinks qtd. in Bates 2015, p. 1170 
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legitimacy of customary international law have obscured attempts to conduct empirical 
research on this front.50 
One of the best attempts to conceptualize the socialization process by which 
international human rights norms come to be accepted and practiced domestically is Risse, 
Sikkink, and Ropp’s 1999 work, The Power of Human Rights.51 In this book they discuss 
socialization as “the induction of new members into the ways of behavior that are preferred in 
a society,”52 and propose a “spiral model” comprising five stages which states go through in 
the process of internalizing human rights norms. These stages include repression, denial, 
tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and rule-consistent behavior.53 The authors argue that 
human rights violations are not intrinsic to a certain set of state conditions, but rather are a 
result of international pressure and the conflicts present in an environment increasingly 
intertwined through human rights treaties.54 This analysis is aimed at synthesizing insights from 
both rationalist and constructivist theories by proposing a rational-choice model through which 
states are influenced by their interaction with the international system.55 One of its foremost 
arguments is that civil society and a robust transnational network of activist groups are a 
catalyst for this model to proceed. This is built upon the idea that civil society generally 
advocates for human rights and pushes the state toward a liberal interpretation of human rights 
norms, a perfect example of ideational-sociological theory.56 
Even this research, however, has been primarily limited to the development of theories 
on general trends of compliance with international law, with case studies sampled from a fully 
international set of countries, legal systems, and levels of interaction in international judicial 
institutions. In the next section I will discuss research has attempted to combine these two 
theoretical approaches, focusing on two authors in particular whose research has examined the 
European Court of Human Rights. Their research design and analyses combining both 
materialist-rationalist and ideational-sociological theories have informed the development of 
this project. 
                                                 
50 See:  Kunz 1953, Kelly 2000, Goldsmith and Posner 1999, and Verdier and Voeten 2015  
51 For a thorough review see Simmons 2013  
52 Checkel and Strom 2000 
53 Risse and Sikkink 1999 
54 Ikenberry 1999 
55 Checkel and Strom 2000 
56 Checkel and Strom 2000 
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Foremost Studies on the ECtHR 
There are two authors whose work has focused on compliance with the ECtHR. The 
first of these, Courtney Hillebrecht, has compiled datasets on compliance across several 
different human rights mechanisms, including tribunals, the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights, the ECtHR, and others. In her 2014 article discussing results specific to the ECtHR, 
she presents the conclusion that “robust domestic institutions, particularly executive 
constraints, are the key to compliance with the European Court of Human Rights.”57 However, 
she does not adequately test for norm diffusion, only measuring the socialization process of 
states via their membership in international human rights agreements. She argues that “the 
more involved a state is in the international human rights system, the more likely the state is to 
be socialized into international norms.”58 This does not in fact measure normative consensus 
but rather assumes that consensus results from participation in international institutions, which 
lacks evidence-based justification and betrays a liberal institutionalist bias to her reasoning. 
Indeed, this is assumption is heavily prevalent in the liberal institutionalist branch of political 
science theory, which argues that institutions are able to combat anarchy in the world order and 
that the repeated structured interaction of states within institutions leads to enhanced 
cooperation and aligning of interests.59  
Hillebrecht’s dataset is also limited to cases and obligations of non-repetition; in other 
words, those which require the state to institute significant structural or institutional change, 
such as the passing of new labor laws. Because of this, as she admits, her research on 
compliance is focused on those judgments which are the least likely for a state to implement, 
and those which are most likely to be influenced by factors such as institutional reactivity, 
legislative flexibility, and material resources. It is not surprising, therefore, that she finds that 
robust institutions are most likely to positively influence the occurrence of compliance within 
this dataset.   
The other primary author who has sought to empirically assess compliance with the 
ECtHR is Andreas von Staden, who has focused his work on determining whether this 
interaction may be better explained through rational or normative theories. Examining the lack 
of compliance with the Court’s judgments from a political science perspective, he concludes 
that compliance with the ECtHR is a rational choice on the part of states, but that it occurs 
                                                 
57 Hillebrecht 2014, p. 1100 
58 Hillebrecht 2014, p. 1113 
59 Grieco 1988 and Herbert 1996  
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within normative constraints.60 In his forthcoming book61, he presents a “hybrid constructivist-
rationalist theory of compliance,” which he argues is particularly adept at explaining the 
compliance of liberal democracies with the ECtHR. For this book project he has utilized both 
a large-n quantitative analysis and comparative case studies on compliance with the ECtHR, 
building a dataset encompassing all judgments issued by the Court between 1960 and 2015. He 
found that, as of March 2017, 43.3% of the ECtHR’s judgments had not been sufficiently 
complied with.62 To better understand the manner in which liberal democracies comply, he also 
conducted case studies comparing the patterns of compliance exhibited by the United Kingdom 
and Germany. His research is one of the first which has attempted to codify the interaction of 
states with the Court from a normative perspective, and his hypothesis is that liberal 
democracies will be better at complying with human rights norms.  
Von Staden’s research promises to be a valuable contribution to the current literature 
on compliance with the ECtHR. Even so, he has employed a large-n quantitative analysis, 
which while useful for establishing correlation may not adequately demonstrate his 
constructivist-rationalist theory in the same way as a qualitative comparative analysis could, 
which may illustrate the interaction between different conditions as well as identify which 
conditions are in fact sufficient or necessary for compliance to take place.  
 
Addressing the Gap 
It is clear from this overview of the literature that no one explanation can account for 
the varying rates of compliance within the Council of Europe. As can be traced throughout the 
literature, there is relatively little work that has been done attempting to establish the presence 
and impact of normative consensus in the Council of Europe and the impact which it may have 
on compliance. The two authors’ studies reviewed above have provided a valuable foundation 
for this project, establishing means of conceptualizing compliance, underscoring the 
importance of domestic institutions, and illustrating the balance between rational and ideational 
motivations for compliance, while still leaving many unanswered questions to explore. They 
have also illustrated the difficulty of determining which theories may best explain the behavior 
of states in relation to the ECtHR, or how they might interact with one another. How are the 
different rationalist and ideational explanations able to offset one another or emphasize one 
another’s singular impacts?  
                                                 
60 Von Staden 2012 
61 Expected date of publication: June 2018 
62 Von Staden 2018 
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This perhaps demonstrates best why the chosen methodology of QCA is appropriate for 
examining the puzzle of compliance with the ECtHR. In a group as diverse as the Council of 
Europe, it seems highly unlikely that one factor would be behind each country’s rates of 
compliance with the Court. This may also demonstrate the rationale behind my chosen 
hypothesis that there is a lack of normative consensus in the Council membership which 
influences the likelihood of compliance. This hypothesis is derived from ideational theories on 
the role which a “cultural match”63 plays in a state’s willingness to implement judgments, but 
it may also be traced in rationalist arguments on the East-West divide. One means by which 
my hypothesis that there is a divide / lack of consensus in the membership may be confirmed 
would be if two distinct pathways toward compliance emerged, one for original CoE members 
and one for those which joined after the fall of the Soviet Union. The other means which I have 
identified for demonstrating the importance of normative consensus and the domestic 
acceptance of norms derives from QCA’s identification of sufficient and necessary conditions, 
which I will describe in the next section. I hypothesize that domestic acceptance of human 
rights norms is a necessary condition for compliance to occur. 
The clear advantage of QCA’s identification of multiple pathways is that it allows for 
the validation of multiple theories of compliance, illustrating the interaction of these two broad 
paradigms through identifying the conditional pathways leading to a lack of compliance. This 
project is necessarily limited by its intermediate-sized N, which allows for identifying certain 
pathways which may be indicative of the whole, but may also be unique to this set of cases. It 
is also an ambitious endeavor to attempt to measure the domestic acceptance of norms; ideally 
this would be accomplished through in-depth collection of official positions and public 
sentiments for each country and case, but due to time limitations this is not possible. In the next 
section I will address how I have sought to overcome these limitations throughout my research 
design. 
  
                                                 
63 Cardenas 2004 
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DATASET AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
Addressing this question is far from a straightforward endeavor, as the dearth of 
literature on the topic suggests. To identify potential pathways resulting in compliance or non-
compliance, incorporating the approaches and findings of previous researchers, this paper will 
utilize Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). This facilitates the testing of other models of 
compliance within a complementary system, whereby multiple conditions may combine and to 
create a robust predictive pathway toward compliance. The dataset for this has been hand-
coded and assembled from multiple sources; in order to use crisp-set QCA, this has required 
translating nuanced qualitative indicators into binary variables representing the different 
conditions which I am testing. In this section I will briefly explain my case selection and how 
I have conceptualized each of these conditions, as well as provide justifications for my data 
selection. In the following section I will connect these conditions to my research design and 
explain how I have calibrated each condition to suit them for csQCA.   
Case Selection 
QCA is most useful in research designs with small to intermediate size Ns, which 
approximates to between 5-50 cases.64 Due to the overwhelming number of ECtHR cases and 
QCA’s size limitation, this project has employed several parameters for limiting the number of 
cases examined. Unlike most projects examining compliance with the ECtHR, my focus is less 
on overall rates of compliance and more on the socialization toward acceptance of human rights 
norms which occurs through its jurisdiction. Thus a narrow selection of cases is appropriate for 
a detailed examination of qualitative trends. To facilitate this selection I first limited the cases 
to be analyzed to those which the ECtHR has deemed to be “landmark” cases, as evidenced by 
their inclusion in the Court’s annual Reports of Judgments and Decisions, which is “an official 
collection of the Court’s leading judgments, decisions, and advisory opinions,”65 as well as 
their inclusion in the lists of landmark cases on their webpage, categorized by norm.66  
Due to the scope of cases which the ECtHR reviews each year, it is necessary to further 
limit the selection of cases. Additionally, my hypothesis that a lack of normative consensus 
contributes to low rates of compliance with ECtHR judgments may be best tested through a 
selection of cases in which normative consensus would be most likely. For this purpose, the 
                                                 
64 Ragin 1987 
65 Van den Eynde 2015 
66 European Court of Human Rights 2018, “Press Resources: Factsheets.” 
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Court’s own categorization of these 
landmark cases by norm proves 
useful. In order to isolate those cases 
where normative consensus would be 
most likely, and therefore non-
compliance would be least expected 
and most worthy of examination,67 I 
have chosen to limit selected cases to 
those related to three well-established 
human rights norms: Gender 
Equality, Children’s Rights, and 
Disability Rights. These three norms are well established areas of human rights, as evidenced 
by their inclusion in the majority of human rights treaties and their own branches within the 
United Nations. Their conventions represent three of the most widely ratified UN treaties, with 
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child having been ratified by 192 countries – more 
than any other human rights treaty in history.68 It is closely followed by the 1979 Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, with 189 ratifying parties,69 
and the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, with 177 ratifying 
parties.70 These three norms are also well suited to this study in that there are a sufficient 
number of cases which have been brought to the court relating to one of the three in order to 
compile a QCA dataset with a roughly even distribution distributed between the three.71 
Additionally, these three norms are not inherently related to any form of political system or 
state of democratic development. This has been taken into account since the majority of cases 
which the Court hears are related to rule of law / judicial proceedings, which may be 
disproportionately represented by some newer members of the CoE which are in the process 
                                                 
67 According to my hypothesis, this would betray a lack of normative consensus. However, this case selection is 
intended to isolate the normative environment to a specific set of norms and to determine whether or not there is 
consensus on this fairly fundamental level. If within this environment non-compliance occurs without a link to 
other clear factors, then it would be clear that even in this widely accepted normative environment there lacks 
consensus. 
68 UNICEF 2005, “Convention on the Rights of the Child: Frequently Asked Questions.” Also UNICEF 2018, 
“What is the UN Convention on Child Rights?” 
69 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 
December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1249, p. 13. See also Askari 1998. 
70 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: resolution / adopted by the 
General Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106.  
71 The dataset I have compiled contains 16 cases related to Children’s Rights, 23 cases related to Disability 
Rights, and 16 cases related to Gender Equality. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of ECtHR cases by Violation  
Source:  ECHR Public Relations Unit 2017 
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of rebuilding their societies, and therefore may have weak democratic / judicial institutions.72 
For instance, as seen in Figure X the most oft-violated article is Art. 6 of the ECHR, which 
states that each individual has a right to a fair trial. Most often the violations of Art. 6 are related 
to the fairness (17.35%) or the length (21.34%) of the proceedings.73  Some authors have levied 
the criticism at major human rights treaties (such as the UNDHR) that they are biased toward 
democratic ideals which are not necessarily representative of the some state’s realities, and a 
weak institutional infrastructure is one such reality that many newer members of the CoE are 
dealing with.74 However, limiting my cases to these three norms also necessarily means that 
the normative consensus which I am measuring can only be extended to gender equality, 
children’s rights, and disability rights. Therefore speculation on a broad normative divide is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Finally, my case selection as been further limited to those which had a judgment issued 
during a window of time from 1990-2012. The starting point of this time period reflects both 
the expansion of the CoE after the fall of the Soviet Union, as well as the period when the CoE 
enhanced its understanding of its monitoring responsibilities and the associated mechanisms 
which it put into place. This offsets the changes which have occurred within the CoE over its 
nearly sixty-year history. The cutoff for this time period, the end of 2012, allows for a five-
year window from their judgment date to the time of this writing, a period which previous 
judges have commented is a reasonable length of time for a case to move from pending to 
closed.75 Naturally some cases require a longer period of time for implementation of their 
obligations, since the cases differ in the complexity of the root problem, but in the measuring 
standards of the CoM and PACE a case remaining unimplemented for more than five years is 
considered to be problematic, and is often then treated to extra review.76 
Additionally, it must be mentioned that only cases which the Court oversaw have been 
included in this dataset. Those proceedings overseeing the admissibility of the case or not have 
been excluded. Thus in each case the violating state has received a list of obligations from the 
Court, with which they are listed as being in compliance or not through the cases’ designation 
of pending or closed. 
                                                 
72 ECHR Public Relations Unit 2017 
73 Ibid. 
74 Mahoney 2002 
75 Muižnieks 2016 
76 Hawkins and Jacoby 2008 and Abdelgawad 2002 
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These selection criteria result in a set of 55 cases, arising from 23 countries across the 
CoE, a spread of countries which may be viewed in Figures 3 and 4.77 This resulted in a 
distribution of 33 cases that have been closed and 22 still pending. This is a somewhat higher 
percentage of cases which have not yet been complied with than exists in the ECtHR’s corpus 
of case judgments, but since the purpose of this study is to determine which combination of 
conditions lead to compliance or non-compliance, a set with high variation in outcome is ideal.  
Figure 3: CoE Member States Represented in Selected Cases 
 
Source: Author-generated map from the compiled dataset 
This selection of cases limited firstly by importance and secondly to cases falling under 
such well-established human rights norms allows for a robust testing of the conditions 
impacting compliance, since these cases are among the most likely to be complied with. The 
“landmark” designation of the case means that it is one which received recognition and 
therefore is most open to being used for reputation and shaming purposes. Similarly since they 
are related to well-established norms, there are greater reputation costs for non-compliance. 
Non-compliance in these most likely of cases, without a clear connection to other theoretically-
derived factors and in conjunction with domestic normative disagreement, would point to a 
lack of normative consensus which would then support my previously discussed hypothesis.  
                                                 
77 One case had to be excluded since the violating country, Andorra, was not included in some of the 
measurements for other conditions. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Selected Cases per State 
 
Source: Author, from compiled dataset 
Measuring Compliance 
As previously discussed, the ECtHR’s monitoring mechanisms for the implementation 
of its judgments have changed somewhat over the course of its history. Unlike its equivalent 
institution in the Americas, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the ECtHR does not 
have a standard mechanism for measuring compliance. Two bodies are tasked with overseeing 
states’ implementation of ECtHR judgments: The Committee of Ministers (CoM) and the 
Parliamentary Assembly (PACE). The Committee of Ministers is comprised of the foreign 
ministers of the member states and is the central decision-making body of the CoE, while the 
Parliamentary Assembly is a consultative body made up of the MPs from all of the member 
states.78 Over the course of their existence they have taken several different approaches toward 
monitoring compliance, and therefore lack an easy and consistent means of measuring overall 
compliance. In the early years of the ECtHR, as previously discussed, they claimed close to 
perfect compliance, but this was based less of rigorous fact-keeping and more on a view that a 
state’s pledge to address the issue was sufficient to count as compliance.79 In the past two 
decades, with the fall of the Iron Curtain and entry of twenty-four additional member states, 
the CoM has taken its role as a monitoring body more seriously.80 It has thus undertaken several 
                                                 
78 Stratfor Partner Perspectives 2013; additional bodies which assist in overseeing the human rights standards 
throughout the CoE include the office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, and the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO). 
79 Von Staden 2012 
80 Hillebrecht 2009 
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major reforms to enhance its monitoring mechanisms, until now its oversight of whether a 
judgment has or has not been implemented is quite rigorous.81 Therefore any discussion of 
compliance is most appropriately centered in the past two decades, but it must be acknowledged 
that over the course of this period of time rates of compliance may have been affected by the 
changing standards of the CoM. 
Additionally, As Hillebrecht rightly points out, compliance with the ECtHR can be 
difficult to measure since states are given a list of obligations in the court’s judgment, all of 
which they would need to fulfill in order to be considered in compliance with the court’s 
decision.82 These obligations may fall into one of three categories; just satisfaction (based on 
Article 21 of the ECHR), individual measures, and general measures, which are measures at 
the national level to ensure that such a violation is not repeated. Hillebrecht’s studies on 
compliance demonstrated that most commonly, states will comply with several of the 
obligations presented by the Court, but not necessarily all. This is related to the fact that not all 
of the obligations are clearly delineated; for instance, those measures in the second and third 
categories of obligations may sometimes be vague and open to the domestic court’s 
interpretation.83 The Court will often set a certain amount of money to be paid in just 
satisfaction, but when discussing individual and general measures the Court lacks consistency 
in the type of obligations introduced. Some may be very specific, but more often, the Court 
abides by the principle of subsidiarity84 toward domestic courts, acknowledging that it is up to 
each country to determine how best to comply. For this reason, they ask countries to submit 
action plans with specific objectives for achieving compliance.85 According to Hillebrecht, it 
is rare that states fulfill all these obligations. Instead, states pick and choose from among them, 
most typically enacting 1-2 out of the average 5-6.86 In Hillebrecht’s dataset, then, she 
                                                 
81 For a full examination of the changing role of the Committee of Ministers in monitoring human rights, see 
Kicker and Mostl 2012. 
82 Hillebrecht 2014 
83 Hervey 2017 
84 “Second, as regards the nature of the obligation on the state to comply with judgments of the Court, it has 
always been interpreted as purely an obligation to produce a specific result: ‘the Court’s judgment leaves to the 
state the choice of the means to be used in its domestic legal system to give effect to the obligation under Article 
53.’This principle has one essential consequence: the Court in principle refuses to indicate to the state the 
measures which need to be taken in order to execute a judgment – a corollary of the subsidiary nature of the 
Convention in relation to domestic systems and of the division of tasks between the Court and the Committee of 
Ministers. Moreover, the Court is in no position to make such an assessment, which presupposes a relatively 
detailed knowledge of the domestic system in question.” Abdelgawad 2002, p. 7 
85 Von Staden 2012, p. 16 
86 Hillebrecht 2014 
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measured compliance with each obligation individually and calculated each country’s rate of 
compliance.  
However this study does not intend to go to that length of detail, and is more interested 
in whether a case has overall been complied with. The best means by which compliance may 
be measured, then, is by the Court’s own mechanism for declaring a case either pending or 
closed. Pending means the judgment has not yet been fully complied with, and is still under the 
CoM’s supervision; it may be that a state has complied with some of the obligations, such as 
just satisfaction, but until the CoM is satisfied that they have fully complied their case will 
remain marked as pending. Once the CoM believes that a state has fully complied they will 
mark a case as closed and bring their supervision of the judgment to an end.87 Data for this 
measurement has been collected from the websites of both the Parliamentary Assembly 
(PACE) and the Committee of Ministers (CoM), which as previously mentioned are the two 
organs responsible for monitoring the compliance of states with their obligations.88 
This demonstrates a distinction between the way researchers view compliance, which 
is itself guided by different theoretical preferences, and the way that practitioners at the Court 
view compliance. The means of measuring compliance depends greatly on the type of research 
being gathered. For large-n studies such as Hillebrecht’s which are seeking to examine trends 
of compliance between different obligations, or studies examining the efficacy of different 
types of obligations in promoting human rights, an examination of compliance with specific 
obligations is useful. However for the purpose of this project, which is less interested in the 
types of compliance and more in the state characteristics which influence the likelihood of 
compliance, the Court’s measurement of whether a case is pending or closed is sufficient. 
 
Normative Consensus 
Measuring the diffusion of norms into a consensus-based human rights scheme, a 
condition derived from ideational-sociological theory as one that would increase the likelihood 
of compliance, is a task for which few researchers have found satisfactory approaches. As a 
qualitative condition, it is difficult to empirically capture for quantitative studies. Measuring 
domestic norm acceptance is a task that several large research institutions, such as Amnesty 
International, Freedom House, and the World Values Survey have attempted. However it is 
clear that no one survey or set of indicators can accurately measure something as abstract as 
                                                 
87 Von Staden 2012, p. 15; Von Staden also noted that “While it may happen that the Committee decides to 
close the supervision of a case despite the Department’s doubts as to whether full compliance has been 
achieved, such occurrences are reportedly very rare.”-  p. 16 
88 Jordan 2003, p. 663 
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normative agreement. This paper realizes this same limitation, but through its combination of 
a number of different quantitative indicators for human rights and civil society, the CIVICUS 
Civil Society Enabling Environment Index (EEI) may provide the best proxy for normative 
acceptance or skepticism.  
This utilization of a civil society index score recalls the ideational-sociological 
argument put forth by Risse, Sikkink, and Ropp in The Power of Human Rights.89 In their 
model for the process of acceptance of human rights norms, they argue that civil society plays 
a key role in advancing a state’s internalization of human rights norms. The normative pressure 
of an international human rights regime, they argue, is most likely to succeed “when members 
of a domestic society support international norms and join transnational networks of 
activists.”90 These networks aid in socialization and promoting a liberal interpretation of human 
rights through their lobbying to place human rights issues on national agendas.91 This is also a 
self-reinforcing trend, as a robust human rights regime tends to empower individuals and civil 
society groups to continue moving the human rights agenda forward.92 Following a plethora of 
literature examining the importance of civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, 
and advocacy networks,93 it is now accepted that such actors serve as “external legitimating 
audiences’ that keep the unlimited exercise of state sovereignty to some degree in check.” 94 
Another author, Cardenas, also emphasizes the importance of civil society in 
developing the resonance and perceived legitimacy of international norms domestically, and 
links it directly to compliance in recognition that “compliance is as much the result of pressures 
from ‘below’ as from ‘above.’”95 This perspective has been echoed by Koh, who maintains that 
human rights compliance is often elicited by transnational legal processes such as the 
interaction between domestic civil societies and transnational human rights networks.96 Thus a 
robust civil society may be directly linked to the promotion of human rights norms and the 
development of normative consensus within a human rights regime such as the Council of 
Europe. 
                                                 
89 As reviewed in Simmons 2013 
90 Cardenas 2004, p. 216 
91 Jordan 2003 
92 Simmons 2013 
93 See Burgerman 2001, Hick et al. Eds. 2000, Keck and Sikkink 1998, and Welch ed. 2001 
94 Simmons 2013, p. 46 
95 Cardenas 2004, p. 215 
96 Cardenas 2004, p. 216 
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CIVICUS defines civil society as “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the 
market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organizations, and institutions, 
to advance shared interests.”97 In measuring the enabling environment of such, CIVICUS seeks 
to identify the conditions in which civil society operates, ranking 109 countries by their 
governance, socio-cultural, and socio-economic environments. It compiles secondary 
statistical data to create the first index which “attempts to measure the long-term conditions 
that affect the potential of citizens to participate in civil society.” 
The EEI combines data from a 71 secondary statistical data sources, including the UN 
Human Development Index, the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights dataset, the World 
Values Survey, the World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World, and Amnesty International.98 Over 70% of their sources are from the years 2010 and 
2011, though data for their socio-cultural dimension dates as far back as 2005 with the 
justification that “socio-cultural trends tend to evolve slowly over time.”99 Through this 
combination of measures, the EEI compiles 71 data points, clustered into 53 indicators, which 
are then clustered into 17 sub-dimensions under the 3 dimensions of governance environment, 
socio-cultural environment, and socio-economic environment. Because of its wide variety of 
sources and coverage of 109 countries, the EEI is the most suitable existing measurement of 
normative environment for this project. It is clear that this is still an imperfect method, and 
with additional time it would be preferable to collect data more specifically related to norms. 
However based on both the previous argumentation of the role which civil society plays in 
fostering human rights norms and the breadth of this index, it is the best tool which I have 
encountered for capturing the social and cultural environment of a country. 
  
                                                 
97 CIVICUS 2018 
98 The full list of data sources for the CIVICUS EEI Index is as follows: UN Human Development Index (2011), 
the World Bank World Development Indicators (2010), Gallup World Polls (2009, 2010), the International 
Telecommunication Union (2011), Social Watch (2012), the World Values Survey (2005-2007), the 
Latinobarometer (2008), the European Values Survey (2008), the Afrobarometer (2005), the World Giving 
Index (2011), the USAID CSO Sustainability Index (2011), the IBP Open Budget Survey (2010), the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2011), Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (2011), 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2011), the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index (2011), 
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World (2011), the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy’s Failed States Index 
(2011), Amnesty International (2010), the US State Department (2010), the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human 
Rights dataset (2010), the Global Integrity Index (2010, 11), the Trade Unions rights violations survey (2011), 
the Reporter Without Borders Press Freedom index (2012), and Freedom House’s Freedom of the Net (2012). 
See CIVICUS 2018. 
99 CIVICUS 2014 
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Other Conditions 
There are many conditions which may influence a state’s relationship with the ECtHR 
and the likelihood of its compliance with the Court’s judgments. A recurring challenge within 
political science is to isolate interlinked conditions in order to explain phenomena such as 
compliance and institutional interaction. As the literature demonstrates, it is not clear which 
factors have the most significant impact on compliance, or how the different factors and 
characteristics unique to each member state interact to increase or decrease the likelihood of 
compliance. So while this paper hypothesizes that a normative divide is one of the factors 
leading to noncompliance, it is also of interest to demonstrate the interaction effects of other 
previously studied variables. Drawing from the literature, I have selected three such variables 
to include as conditions in my QCA analysis. These include Hillebrecht’s primary explanatory 
variable of robust domestic institutions, Von Staden’s primary explanatory variable of liberal 
democracy, and finally drawing from several other authors, whether or not a country was a 
founding member of the Council. In this next section I will discuss how I have chosen to 
operationalize these variables into binary conditions suited to csQCA. 
 
Robust Domestic Institutions 
Firstly, Hillebrecht’s argument that “stronger domestic institutions increase the 
likelihood of compliance with human rights tribunals rulings” deserves to be examined in an 
alternate setting than her original large-n quantitative study, since her original research design 
was inclined toward the importance of institutions. She argues that domestic institutions place 
restraints on the executive and limit their ability to shirk compliance obligations, and therefore 
utilized the xconst variable from the Polity IV data set as her primary explanatory variable. 
This composite variable “takes into account ‘the extent of institutionalized constraints on the 
decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities.’”100 Ranging 
from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating strong institutions and therefore high democratic 
accountability, this variable is measured each year in the annual Polity IV research project, 
hosted by the Center for Systemic Peace. To test for robustness, she also ran models using the 
Polity IV general polity score and the Democratic Accountability score from the International 
Country Risk Guide.101 To test Hillebrecht’s hypothesis, I decided to translate this variable into 
a condition which might increase the likelihood of compliance. To do so, I took the averages 
                                                 
100 Hillebrecht 2014, p. 1110 
101 Hillebrecht 2014, p. 1110 
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for each country’s xconst score from the years of 2006, 2009, and 2012.102 However, this did 
not result in a set with enough variance to have any meaning for this study. Of the 23 countries, 
two were not included in the xconst dataset (Iceland and Malta), and of the rest only three 
countries did not receive a score of 7 (France, Russia, and Ukraine). Even Turkey, which is 
often an outlier in other measurements of governance and human rights, received a score of 7 
by this measurement. 
I therefore decided to use a different indicator of institutional strength, for which I 
turned to the World Governance Indicators (WGI). These indicators are gathered by the World 
Bank, which acknowledges that it is a difficult endeavor to properly conceptualize strength or 
weakness of governance. This is due to the reality that, although “the concept of governance is 
widely discussed among policymakers and scholars, there is as yet no strong consensus around 
a single definition of governance or institutional quality.”103 However due to its usefulness in 
studies on governance, its careful methodology, and its enhanced trustworthiness from several 
studies examining its validity104, the World Governance Indicators are one of the most 
employed indexes in studies of correlates with traits of governance.105 As one author put it, 
“the use of WGIs provides insights into governance, which would be more difficult to obtain 
with strictly objective and quantifiable measures.”106 
The World Governance Indicators provide a unique perspective in that their data is 
collected exclusively based on “perceptions-based governance data sources.”107 This includes 
a broad range of surveys and subjective assessments from other information providers, non-
governmental institutions, multilateral organizations, and other public-sector agencies. These 
are combined into composite indicators measuring six different dimensions of governance. 
These tend to be strongly correlated with one another since they are inter-dependent and have 
complementary relationships,108 so to simplify my methodology I chose to utilize one indicator, 
Rule of Law, which seems most appropriate for this project’s focus on judicial systems. This 
indicator captures “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
                                                 
102 This selection of dates allows for a cross-section of the period of time in which the selected cases have taken 
place. 2006 represents the average year of the original judgment date, 2012 represents the cutoff date of the 
selected cases, and 2009 as the median allows for the compilation of a representative average score. 
103 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, p. 2 
104 See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007, Gisselquist 2014, and Charron 2010 
105 Charron 2010 
106 De Barros Leal Pinheiro Marino et al 2016, p. 727 
107 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010 p. 4 
108 Ibid. 
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police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”109 This then would 
measure how well the government’s adherence to principles of law is perceived, which relates 
to the public’s trust in their judicial institutions to protect their rights. I then collected state’s 
scores for the years 2006, 2009, and 2012 and calculated each country’s average score.110 Since 
Hillebrecht’s key explanatory variable of robust domestic institutions relates to more than just 
judicial institutions,111 I checked these scores against those for the Government Effectiveness 
Indicator, utilizing the same method of averaging scores over the three years of 2006, 2009, 
and 2012. This indicator captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies.”112 Between the two indicators there was no difference in final score of above or 
below the median, so I concluded that it is reasonable to use the Rule of Law indicator as a 
proxy for the strength of domestic governance institutions.  
 
Liberal Democracy 
Secondly, I included the condition of liberal democracy (yes or no) to incorporate Von 
Staden’s argument that liberal democracies are more likely to comply with ECtHR judgments. 
He uses the Polity IV scores, averaged across the number of years the state has been subject to 
the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. As discussed previously, Hillebrecht also used the Polity IV scores 
in her argument that robust domestic institutions increased the likelihood of compliance. 
Therefore both due to this fact and the limitations with this measurement method for my 
selected cases, I adopted a different measurement: Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 
Index. According to this index, countries are categorized as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. 
Freedom House considers those countries which receive the label of Free to be liberal 
                                                 
109 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, p. 3 
110 As discussed previously in relation to the years selected for compiling countries’ xconst scores, these three 
years are sufficient for generating an average over the period of time represented by the selected cases. This 
additional step may be unnecessary, as the World Bank observed in Kaufmann et al p.13, comparing changes 
from 2000-2009, that “changes in our estimates of governance in most countries are relatively small even over 
the decade covered.” However, this step allows for some mitigation of the impact from political and 
infrastructural changes over the time span covered, which could influence whether a country places compliance 
as a priority or not.  
111 Although Hillebrecht does not give a straightforward definition of what she considers a domestic institution, 
her combination of the Polity IV data set’s xconst score and general polity score along with the Democratic 
Accountability Score from the International Country Risk Guide demonstrates that she is primarily interested in 
measures of quality of governance and level of democracy. 
112 Kaufmann Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, p. 3 
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democracies.113 Comparing that measurement with several others, it appears to be a consistent 
standard by which academics and policymakers alike define liberal democracy, and therefore 
has been selected for usage in this analysis. 
 
Founding Member 
An additional condition which I have chosen to include is aimed at describing the 
embeddedness of a state in the normative environment of the Council of Europe. This is based 
in studies of socialization such as those undertaken by Checkel and Voeten, which have 
discussed the impact which prolonged membership in an institution may have on the process 
of norm acceptance amongst adherent states.114 It is a common argument amongst Europeanists 
that prolonged exposure to an institution, marked by repeated meetings over long periods, can 
contribute to a socialization process bringing different normative regimes into alignment, 
which would combat the effect of normative dissonance.115 This may also be linked to 
neoliberal institutionalist theory, which posits that through membership and structured 
interaction in an institution, states may counteract the anarchy inherent in the world order and 
become increasingly aligned as they seek cooperation and alignment of their interests and 
goals.116 This argument is also supported by ideational-sociological theories, as demonstrated 
by Beach’s observation that a social institution such as the Council of Europe, at the time its 
creation, “naturally reflects the instrumental interests of actors, but over time, through actor 
participation and interaction with the legal system, compliance becomes an internalized social 
practice that makes normative prescriptions for acceptable behavior.”117 
Socialization is difficult to measure, however, particularly in a binary fashion. There 
are two methods which have been considered for attempting to capture this dynamic in this 
study. The first would be to divide the states included in this study into two groups: those who 
joined in the first few decades of the CoE, and those who joined in the oft-labeled “expansion” 
of the CoE, which occurred in the 1990s. However, this method of measuring the impact of 
prolonged membership and socialization effects might not measure socialization at all, as those 
states which joined in the second expansion are overwhelmingly post-Soviet and communist 
states. A lack of compliance amongst this group might be more related to their differing 
political ideologies than the shorter period of time in which they have been members of the 
                                                 
113 Freedom House 2018 
114 Checkel 2005 and Voeten 2014  
115 Checkel 2005; see also Byers 1999 
116 Herbert 1996,  p. 228 
117 Beach 2006, p. 123 
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CoE. Von Staden also agrees with the significance of this condition, noting that “with the 
exception of Italy, all states with compliance rates below 70 percent are states that became 
subject to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction only after the end of the Cold War, and of these all except 
for Turkey (which accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in 1990) are formerly communist or 
socialist countries.”118 However, he also agrees that this does not in fact necessarily measure 
the impact of socialization into a set of norms, but rather directly corresponds to formerly 
communist/socialist countries. This difference in political ideology therefore may have its own 
impact on the presence or absence of normative consensus. 
Therefore I have chosen an alternate means for measuring the length of time which a 
state has participated in the CoE. This involves categorizing states as either founding members 
or later signatories. The border cases in this means of measurement are Greece, Turkey, and 
Iceland, all of which both joined within a year of the CoE’s founding.119 Of these three cases, 
Greece withdrew from the Council during the years of 1967-1974 due to a military junta, and 
Turkey has consistently been criticized by the Council for its lack of adherence to certain 
principles of human rights.120 Meanwhile Iceland has a strong record of human rights and 
compliance with the ECtHR, as do many of the other countries which joined after the initial 
formation of the Council. However examining trends of compliance as a whole, Jordan has 
noted that “countries in the high-compliance group were among the first to join the Council.”121 
Additionally, examinations of the efficacy of international institutions have concluded that 
those which are most effective at eliciting compliance “rely on prior sociological, ideological, 
and institutional convergence toward common norms.”122 At the same time it has been seen 
that “empirical studies demonstrate that the socializing effects of European institutions are 
uneven and often surprisingly weak, and in no way can be construed as shaping a new, post-
national identity.”123 Some authors have also noted that there are significant outliers within the 
trends of high and low compliance, and that according to existing measures “some states in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are quickly socialized into the dominant values 
of the West, while others are laggards.”124  
                                                 
118 Von Staden 2018  
119 Council of Europe 2018 
120 Rankin 2017, CVCE 2018, and Wesslau 2017  
121 Jordan 2003, p. 668 
122 Moravcsik 1995, p. 178 
123 Checkel 2005, p. 815 
124 Checkel 2005, p. 803 
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This altogether demonstrates a lack of unanimity within the literature on the impact of 
length of membership on a state’s cooperation with international institutions. It is therefore a 
valuable condition to include, to allow for an analysis of the importance with which early 
membership may be imbued. Additionally, it may illustrate whether there are different 
pathways to compliance for those who created the European Convention for Human Rights 
than for those who signed later, which would have implications for the future development of 
the CoE’s role in promoting normative consensus.125 
In summary, the selected conditions are outlined in Table 3 on the following page. The 
raw data compiled from these different sources may be seen in the appendix, in Table 1A.  
  
                                                 
125 Indeed, there has already been a great deal of discussion on whether the Court needs to adapt its procedures 
so that it can provide extra support to those states which have consistently low scores of compliance, but as of 
yet this is controversial because it is seen as discriminatory against such states. For more see Muižnieks 2016 
and Keller, Fischer, and Kuhne 2010. 
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Table 3: Overview of conditions selected for testing 
Condition Coding Data Source 
Purpose / Justification from 
Literature 
Domestic Norm 
Acceptance 
(EEI) 
 
Acceptance / 
Positive 
Environment for 
Civil Society (1) or 
Skepticism / 
Negative 
Environment for 
Civil Society (0), 
with positive or 
negative 
categorized as 
above or at/below 
the median of all 
CoE member 
states’ scores 
CIVICUS EEI To test the hypothesis that a lack of 
normative consensus decreases the 
likelihood of compliance with the 
ECtHR’s judgments 
Rule of Law / 
Institutional 
Robustness 
(WGIRoL) 
Above (1) or 
at/below (0) the 
median of all CoE 
member states’ 
scores 
World Governance 
Indicators, Rule of 
Law 
Hillebrecht argues that strong domestic 
institutions which place constraints on 
executive power are essential for 
compliance with human rights 
judgments.126 While difficult to measure, 
the combination of dimensions measured 
through the World Governance 
Indicators’ Rule of Law index can serve 
as a suitable proxy for this effect. 
Liberal 
Democracy 
(LibDem) 
Yes (1) or No (0) Freedom House 
Freedom in the 
World Index 
Von Staden argues that socialization 
toward compliance is particularly strong 
amongst liberal democracies, who use 
nominal compliance with international 
institutions such as the ECtHR to 
validate their label as “liberal 
democracies.”127 
Founding 
Member 
(FoundMem) 
Yes (1) or No (0) Council of Europe To measure whether compliance with the 
CoE is influenced by the length of time 
which a state has been a member, based 
on arguments from Checkel, Voeten, 
Von Staden, and others. 
 
  
                                                 
126 Hillebrecht 2014 
127 Von Staden 2012 
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QCA RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Assessing compliance with ECtHR rulings has most commonly been done through 
large-n quantitative analysis or individual case studies, with the most thorough studies utilizing 
some combination of the two. While these attempts are beneficial for both establishing overall 
trends and examining the complexity of specific cases, this type of analysis does not allow for 
the possibility of multiple pathways and combinations of conditions which lead to the increased 
or decreased likelihood of compliance. Utilizing QCA allows for the complexity of factors 
which lead to certain outcomes as well as provides the ability to test for causality, identifying 
which conditions are the most important for a state’s compliance.128 Additionally, this approach 
is valuable for theory testing, as it allows for multiple explanations while establishing which 
are most fundamental. As QCA is as of yet a relatively little-known method, in the next section 
I will briefly outline its functioning and methodological contribution to the social sciences, 
before discussing how it will be employed in this project. 
 
Overview of QCA  
QCA is a relatively new 
method within the social 
sciences, but it is becoming 
increasingly popular as a means 
of examining which 
combinations of conditions lead 
to particular outcomes, and is 
“one of the most influential 
recent innovations in social 
science methodology.”129 
Throughout the first half of the 
20th century much political science research focused on interpretative work, including theory 
development and historical analysis.130 As Figure 4 illustrates, it was not until the latter half of 
the century that political scientists began to address the notion of causality in earnest. This rise 
                                                 
128 Ragin et al 2017 
129 Thiem and Dusa 2013, p. 87 
130 Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier 2008 
 
Figure 4: Chart illustrating the growth in usage of the terms "causal" or 
"causality" over the 20th century 
Source: Box-Steffensmeier et al 2008 
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in “causal thinking” along with the new opportunities for research afforded by digital data131 
has led to the development of new tools and methods, such as QCA, which first appeared in 
the late 1980s, designed and first employed by Ragin.132 As Ragin described, the goal of QCA 
is to “integrate the best features of the case-oriented approach with the best features of the 
variable-oriented approach.”133 QCA employs Boolean algebra, a mathematical method built 
upon set theory in which binary variables and a true/false analysis are used to identify which 
combinations of true/false variables lead to particular outcomes. In other words, “the typical 
Boolean-based comparative analysis addresses the presence/absence of conditions under which 
a certain outcome is obtained (that is, is true). Thus, in a Boolean analysis of social data all 
variables, causal conditions and outcome, must be nominal-scale measures, preferably 
binary.”134 Due to its employment of Boolean algebra, QCA is able to begin to explore 
causality, as certain combinations of conditions, known as pathways, receive a consistency 
score (%) at which they are able to predict a particular outcome.  
Within these different pathways and conditional relationships, QCA also allows the 
researcher to identify which conditions are sufficient or necessary for a certain outcome to 
occur. Figure 5 provides a 
visual of these relationships: 
if for instance Condition A is 
necessary, then Outcome Y 
can only occur in an 
environment where 
Condition A is present (set-
theoretic notation: Y → A; 
reads “if Y then A”). If, on 
the other hand, Condition A 
is sufficient, then any time 
Condition A is present Outcome Y occurs (set theoretic notation: A → Y; “if A then Y”). This 
does not exclude the possibility of other conditions leading to Outcome Y as well.  
                                                 
131 Jungherr and Theocharis 2017 
132 Rihoux and De Meur 2009  
133 Ragin 1987, p.84  
134 Ragin et al 2017, p.31 
 
Figure 5: Necessity and Sufficiency in QCA 
Source: Legewie 2013 
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QCA also allows for analysis of the “interaction effects” between each condition.135 Its 
ability to outline equifinality, whereby more than one pathway leads to the same outcome, is 
particularly suited to studies such as this which examine complex social factors.136 Additionally 
QCA allows for the existence of conjectural causation, wherein a combination of conditions is 
the most potent for bringing about a particular outcome.137 This illustrates the complex social 
reality that the strength of certain conditions is amplified by the presence or absence of other 
conditions.138 This is crucial for the question of compliance with the ECtHR, which as the 
authors previously mentioned have discussed is far from straightforward, linked to multiple 
theoretical perspectives, and dependent on each state’s domestic context.  
 
Research Design 
There are several varieties of QCA which vary in complexity and descriptive/predictive 
ability. For the limited scope of this project, I will use the original form, known as Crisp-Set 
QCA (csQCA). This version of QCA, unlike some of its more complex variants such as fuzzy-
set, requires transposing complex qualitative indicators into binary (true/false) conditions.139 
csQCA has been critiqued for this erasing of nuance, which could lead to researchers coming 
to quite different results depending on the specific thresholds chosen for categorizing 
conditions as either present or absent. However, this may be mitigated through careful coding 
as well as running multiple analyses with different thresholds at which variables are translated 
into true/false conditions.140 Due to time constraints, this second option has not been possible. 
However the calibration of each condition, as described in the following section, has been 
implemented based on previous literature and theory, and therefore different thresholds would 
only provide checks of robustness. This does result in a number of border cases, which if the 
threshold were slightly changed would have different results; I will discuss this further in my 
results and limitations sections. 
  
                                                 
135 Lee 2014 
136 Kane et al 2014 
137 Elliott 2013 
138 Ragin et al 2017 
139 Ibid. 
140 Also researcher’s knowledge of the data; since there aren’t that many cases this method, unlike large-n 
studies, allows the researcher to be familiar with the context of each of the utilized cases. Cragun et al.  2015, p. 
252 
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Calibration of Selected Conditions 
In this section I will discuss how each of the conditions conceptualized previously has 
been operationalized for this analysis. According to Boolean algebra, there are two possible 
states for the conditions analyzed: true (or present) or false (or absent). 141 This is represented 
by a coding of 1 (true) or 0 (false).  
Firstly, my outcome variable of compliance has been simplified so that a case will be 
said to have been complied with or not complied with based on the CoM’s designation of 
pending or closed. This does not require any additional calibration, and therefore has been 
coded as pending/not complied (0) or closed/complied (1). 
My primary condition of interest, normative consensus, has proved to be much more 
difficult to translate into a binary condition. As will be seen with my other conditions, the EEI 
index142 has been heavily simplified, and has been accomplished through taking the median 
score for member states of the Council of Europe and categorizing states as either above (1) or 
at/below (0) the median score. In relation to the condition of normative consensus, this equates 
to a country as having an environment of either acceptance (1) or skepticism (0) toward the 
previously discussed selected norms. The median has been taken, rather than the average, in 
recognition that some countries in the Council of Europe, such as Russia, are regular outliers 
in many of these qualitative measures of society / governance. Therefore rather than offset the 
group’s average to appear lower than in fact true, the median score allows for a more 
representative picture of the CoE member states as a whole. As in my other conditions, my 
rationale for this division is based on the generally high scores which are observed in the 
Council of Europe. I took the median of all member states, not just those represented in this 
dataset, to avoid the occurrence of a 50/50 split, which due to the application of QCA’s set 
theory would merely produce two equally sized sets, undermining the validity of the resulting 
pathways. To double check that this was a suitable means of dividing the states, I compared 
these scores with those from taking the average across the CoE, and found no difference in the 
resulting calibration.  
Institutional Robustness, the condition sourced from Hillebrecht’s research, has the 
same issue, as it is derived from a complex qualitative indicator. Using the same strategy as 
employed above, I first compiled each country’s WGI Rule of Law score by taking the average 
of each CoE member states’ score from the years 2006, 2009, and 2012, and then took the 
                                                 
141 Ragin et al 2017 
142 As mentioned previously, the EEI index primarily covers the years 2010-2011, though some of its variables 
date back to 2005. It is therefore a single index not done on a repeating basis. 
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median of WGI Rule of Law scores for all the CoE member states, coding each country as 
being above (1) or at/below (0) the median score.  
Liberal Democracy, the condition which Von Staden argues makes compliance more 
likely, requires minimal calibration as states are already fairly consistently categorized as being 
either a liberal democracy or not. I gathered the Freedom House scores from 2009, since that 
represents the median year for my data. Those countries which Freedom House labeled as Free 
are coded in my dataset with 1, representing a positive attribution as a liberal democracy. 
Countries which are labeled as either Partly Free or Not Free are coded in my dataset with 0, 
representing the lack of attribution as a liberal democracy. While valuable for this study to test 
Von Staden’s hypothesis, this condition is not ultimately expected to add much to my analysis 
since there is not nearly enough variation in my dataset. As previously discussed with the Polity 
IV xcconst scores, only two countries received a label other than Free: Russia and Turkey. 
Therefore this condition, it may be argued, has little to no meaning. I will return to this 
discussion in the limitations section.  
My final condition, founding member, is also already a true/false condition which 
requires no additional calibration. It has therefore been coded as founding (1) or not founding 
(0). The data for this comes from the Council of Europe’s website, where it has individual 
pages for each country.143 
 My truth table, the term for a dataset primed for QCA analysis, may be found in the 
appendix, in Table 2A.  
  
                                                 
143 Council of Europe 2018 
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QCA ANALYSIS 
 
In this section I will present and discuss the results generated from QCA regressions on 
my truth table. Through the process of minimization,144 QCA identifies those pathways / 
combinations of conditions which are able to explain cases grouped by a particular outcome. 
The below table provides the results for running a QCA regression on the outcome of 
compliance. The raw coverage shows the extent to which each set-combination explains the 
outcome, while the unique coverage displays the proportion of cases which may be explained 
exclusively by that pathway.145 The consistency score shows how consistent the outcome is in 
each set of cases, and the solution coverage and consistency displays how accurately these 
identified pathways explain the set combinations within the truth table. 
QCA Regressions 
 
Table 4: QCA Regression, Outcome=Compliance 
 Raw Coverage Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency 
WGIRoL*LibDem*~FoundMem 0.272727 0.121212 0.692308 
WGIRoL*LibDem*EEI 0.66667 0.515152 0.91667 
~WGIRoL*LibDem*FoundMem 0.030303 0.030303 1 
    
Solution coverage: 0.818182 
Solution consistency: 0.870968 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, the identified conditions and pathways are not able to sufficiently 
explain all of the cases, with a solution coverage of approximately 82%. Within this set of 
pathways, however, there is a reasonably high consistency score of 87%, so we can expect that 
this solution does capture overall trends and relationships between conditions fairly well.146 
 This regression identified three pathways to compliance. The first comprises a high 
WGI score, a positive categorization as a Liberal Democracy, and a negative status as a 
                                                 
144 Boolean minimization reduces the number of possible combinations of conditions to those that are 
“generalizations of the patterns that exist in the data set and are minimized in their complexity.” Legewie 2013, 
p. 39  
145 Legewie 2013 
146 For replication purposes, please note that no assumptions were made regarding the presence or absence of 
these conditions toward the outcome. An alternate strategy would be to assume that the presence of these 
conditions would  
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founding member.147 With only 12% unique coverage and a consistency of nearly 70%, this is 
not a terribly strong pathway.  
 The second pathway comprises a high WGI score, a positive categorization as a liberal 
democracy, and a high EEI score (this study’s proxy for normative consensus). This covers 
about two-thirds of the cases resulting in compliance, and as seen in the table approximately 
52% of the cases only fall under this pathway.148 With a consistency score of 92%, this set-
combination serves as a strong predictor for the occurrence of compliance, and therefore 
supports my hypothesis that normative consensus is an important condition leading toward 
compliance. Whether or not it may be categorized as either a sufficient or necessary condition 
will be discussed momentarily. 
 The final pathway, with a coverage of only 3%, only applies to one case, that of Godelli 
v. Italy, which is also the only case from Italy which was included in the dataset.149 This 
demonstrates that Italy’s path toward compliance is different than all the other countries’; hence 
the perfect consistency score of 100%, as within the set of cases following this pathway there 
is perfect consistency. This pathway comprises a low WGI score combined with a positive 
categorization as a liberal democracy and a positive status as founding member. Since this 
pathway only explains one case, it does not contribute significantly to our understanding of 
overall trends. 
 The next step in analyzing this dataset via QCA is conducting the same regression but 
negated, identifying pathways toward non-compliance. This regression only identified one 
pathway, shown in Table 5 below. 
 
                                                 
147 Cases (which follow this pathway include) with greater than 0.5 membership in term 
WGIRoL*LibDem*~FoundMem: ZemanvAustria (1,1),  
KutznervGermany (1,1), KarlheinzSchmidtvGermany (1,1), BrauervGermany (1,0),  
KjartanAsmundssonvIceland (1,1), MizzivMalta (1,1), ZarbAdamivMalta (1,1),  
GenovesevMalta (1,0), JaggivSwitzerland (1,1), SchulerZgraggenvSwitzerland (1,1),  
LosonciRoseandRosevSwitzerland (1,1), GlorvSwitzerland (1,0), BurghartzvSwitzerland (1,0) 
148 Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term WGIRoL*LibDem*EEI: ZemanvAustria (1,1),  
StagnovBelgium (1,1), OsmanvDenmark (1,1), VincentvFrance (1,1),  
MocievFrance (1,1), KouaPoirrezvFrance (1,1), DraonvFranceandMauricevFrance (1,1),  
MazurekvFrance (1,1), KjartanAsmundssonvIceland (1,1), SenvNL (1,1),  
CampandBourimivNL (1,1), VanRaaltevNL (1,1), FolgeroandOthersvNorway (1,1),  
JaggivSwitzerland (1,1), SchulerZgraggenvSwitzerland (1,1), LosonciRoseandRosevSwitzerland (1,1),  
GlorvSwitzerland (1,0), BurghartzvSwitzerland (1,0), PricevtheUK (1,1),  
HLvtheUK (1,1), GlassvtheUK (1,1), WillisvtheUK (1,1), HobbsRichardWalshGeenvtheUK (1,1), 
RunkeeandWhitevtheUK (1,1). 
149 Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~WGIRoL*LibDem*FoundMem*~EEI: GodellivItaly (1,1) 
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Table 5: QCA Regression, Outcome=~Compliance 
 Raw Coverage Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency 
~WGIRoL*~FoundMem*~EEI 0.818182 0.818182 0.75 
    
Solution coverage: 0.818182 
Solution consistency: 0.75 
 
This pathway explains 82% of the cases which result in non-compliance, and within the 
cases that conform to this set of conditions 75% are not in compliance.150 The conditions, as 
listed above, are a low WGI score, a negative status as founding member, and a low EEI score. 
We can therefore conclude that a state which has these conditions is much less likely to comply 
with a judgment from the ECtHR. 
 
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 
Before examining these results in further detail, it is also key to my research question 
and hypothesis to utilize QCA’s identification of necessary and sufficient conditions. The 
below tables demonstrate the results; in this analysis, consistency refers to how consistently 
the outcome corresponds to the condition, and therefore a perfect consistency score equates to 
a necessary condition. Coverage refers to how consistently the condition corresponds to the 
outcome, and therefore a perfect consistency score identifies a sufficient condition. Table 6 
displays the scores for each condition in relation to an outcome of compliance, while Table 7 
displays those for an outcome of noncompliance.    
                                                 
150 Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~WGIRoL*~FoundMem*~EEI: StanevvBulgaria (1,1),  
AKandLvCroatia (1,0), MikulicvCroatia (1,0), OrsusandOthersvCroatia (1,0),  
DordevicvCroatia (1,1), AvCroatia (1,1), DHandOthersvtheCzechRepublic (1,1),  
ZHvHungary (1,1), AlajosKissvHungary (1,1), JasinskisvLatvia (1,1),  
DDvLithuania (1,1), RRvPoland (1,1), AMMvRomania (1,0),  
HuleavRomania (1,0), ArutyunyanvRussia (1,1), ShtukaturovvRussia (1,1),  
LashinvRussia (1,1), TimishevvRussia (1,1), KonstantinMarkinvRussia (1,1),  
CyprusvTurkey (1,1) HasanandEylemZenginvTurkey (1,1), UnalTekelivTurkey (1,1), OpuzvTurkey (1,1). 
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Table 6: Necessary/Sufficient Conditions, Outcome=Compliance 
Condition Consistency Coverage 
WGIRoL 0.787879 0.866667 
~WGIRoL 0.212121 0.28000 
LibDem 1.00000 0.717391 
~LibDem 0.00000 0.00000 
FoundMem 0.545455 1.00000 
~FoundMem 0.454545 0.405405 
EEI 0.666667 0.916667 
~EEI 0.333333 0.354839 
 
 
Table 7: Necessary/Sufficient Conditions, Outcome=~Compliance 
Condition Consistency Coverage 
WGIRoL 0.181818 0.133333 
~WGIRoL 0.818182 0.720000 
LibDem 0.590909 0.282609 
~LibDem 0.409091 1.00000 
FoundMem 0.00000 0.00000 
~FoundMem 1.00000 0.594595 
EEI 0.090909 0.083333 
~EEI 0.909091 0.645161 
 
Although unexpected, according to this analysis a positive status as a founding member 
of the CoE (FoundMem) is a sufficient condition for compliance to occur. Additionally, a 
positive categorization as a liberal democracy is a necessary condition. In other words, the 
status of being a founding member of the CoE is in itself enough to predict compliance on the 
part of the state, and compliance does not occur unless the country is a liberal democracy. This 
may be traced throughout the previously identified pathways toward compliance, in which 
every pathway to compliance included a positive categorization as a liberal democracy. A 
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strong EEI score, relating to the strength of civil society promoting human rights norms leading 
to normative consensus, does not have a strong enough impact to be either a sufficient or 
necessary condition for compliance to occur. With a coverage score of 0.92 for the outcome of 
compliance, this condition does come close to being sufficient, but is not quite. Similarly, a 
low EEI score, with a consistency of 0.91, comes close to being a necessary condition for 
noncompliance. This would indicate that while my hypothesis has not been proven, a country’s 
EEI does have strong predictive power, and therefore there does exist some credence to my 
formulation of the conditions making compliance more or less likely. 
Of course in practice we know that this is not how it works; there are a number of states 
which were founding members of the CoE which have outstanding cases with which they have 
not yet complied.151 However, these cases are actually quite rare, so it could be that except for 
extraordinary circumstances, being a founding member of the CoE would assume a state of 
compliance with ECtHR judgments.  
As we have already discussed, the label of liberal democracy does not hold that much 
meaning in this analysis since there was relatively little variation. It is therefore unsurprising 
that this analysis has identified it as a necessary condition for compliance to occur. 
 
Critical Cases 
There is plentiful room for further research and investigation into these results, and 
what exactly they can tell us about patterns of compliance with the European Court of Human 
Rights. In this section I have identified several key points which arise from this limited study, 
mostly arising from the contradictions present in the various pathways. As is the custom with 
QCA, these may best be analyzed through closer inspection of the cases at hand. This is one of 
the benefits of QCA; the researcher is able to have more interaction with the particular cases 
because there are relatively few.152 
It is firstly of interest to examine the cases which did not align with the identified 
pathways; in other words, by resolving the contradictions in the set-combinations we can learn 
more about their predictive ability. One of the primary assumptions of crisp-set QCA is that 
“contradictions will always occur if the explanatory model is not correctly specified (omitted 
variables, measurement error, heterogeneity of the research population, etc.) or when it does 
                                                 
151 One such example is the United Kingdom, which has been engaged in a protracted debate over protections 
for prisoner’s rights with the ECtHR. For details see Jay 2017. 
152 Ragin 1987 
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not make theoretical sense.”153 It is therefore important to determine the source of these 
contradictions. Within the pathways identified for compliance, there were several countries 
which had cases both of compliance and non-compliance, and therefore while the conditions 
(since they are country-specific rather than case-specific) remain the same, the outcome is 
different. The following countries demonstrated such contradictions within the pathway 
WGIRoL*LibDem*~FoundMem: 
Table 8: Contradictions in the Pathways to Compliance 
Country Compliance Norms 
Switzerland Total Cases: 5  
 Compliance: 3 Gender Equality (2), 
Children’s Rights (1) 
 ~Compliance: 2 Disability Rights (1), 
Gender Equality (1) 
   
Germany Total Cases: 3  
 Compliance: 2 Disability Rights (1), 
Gender Equality (1) 
 ~Compliance: 1 Children’s Rights (1) 
   
Malta Total Cases: 3  
 Compliance: 2 Gender Equality (2) 
 ~Compliance: 1 Children’s Rights (1) 
 
Although up until this point the human rights norms associated with each case have not 
been utilized, at this point in the analysis they may provide an additional layer of detail for 
examining what leads these countries to comply in some cases but not others. The first question 
would be whether cases of non-compliance in these countries correspond with a particular 
norm, but as the table above demonstrates there does not appear to be any consistency on this 
front. The cases also are evenly spread across the time period examined; there do not appear to 
be any clusters corresponding with compliance or non-compliance. Therefore the reason for 
non-compliance in these cases, despite their fulfillment of the conditions for a pathway to 
compliance, must be extraneous to the conditions selected for this study. 
For the second pathway to compliance, WGIRoL*LibDem*EEI, there is perfect 
consistency except for three cases, all of which are from Switzerland. Being the same cases as 
above, they exhibit the same normative and temporal diversity.  
                                                 
153 Marx and Dusa 2011, p. 104 
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The third pathway describing the conditions leading to compliance for Italy, 
~WGIRoL*LibDem*FoundMem, despite having perfect consistency, points to the need for 
further area for research. This is because, despite following a pathway toward compliance, Italy 
has in fact one of the lowest rates of compliance in the entire CoE.154 This will be discussed 
further in the next section. 
When analyzing the conditions leading toward noncompliance, there were fewer 
potential pathways and more prominent contradictions. The only pathway to noncompliance 
identified, ~WGIRoL*~FoundMem*~EEI, had two countries with contradictions, where in 
some cases they complied and others not.  
Table 9: Contradictions in the Pathways to Noncompliance 
Country Compliance Norms 
Croatia Total Cases: 5  
 Compliance: 3 Children’s Rights (2), 
Disability Rights (1) 
 ~Compliance: 2 Disability Rights (1), 
Gender Equality (1) 
   
Romania Total Cases: 2  
 Compliance: 2 Disability Rights (1), 
Gender Equality (1) 
 ~Compliance: 0  
   
 
As seen in the above table, there is no clear pattern related to the norms each case 
addresses. Both countries, despite conforming to the pathway identified as leading toward 
noncompliance, have overall compliant trends, with Croatia at 60% compliant and Romania at 
100% compliant. There is once again no explanatory temporal diversity in these cases, 
therefore the cause for their compliance despite following the pathway toward noncompliance 
must be external to the conditions presented in this analysis. 
Thus in examining the critical cases for the pathways toward compliance and the 
pathway toward noncompliance, we may see that the countries and cases of Switzerland, 
Germany, Malta, Italy, Croatia, and Romania deserve further attention. While there is not 
sufficient space in this thesis to pursue an in-depth review of each country and each case, what 
follows is a brief examination of a select few of these countries which have proven to be 
countries of concern for the CoM in its monitoring activities. 
 
                                                 
154 Hillebrecht 2014, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals, p. 125 
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Italy 
As mentioned previously, Italy is one of the worst offenders when it comes to 
noncompliance with judgments from the ECtHR.155 The Parliamentary Assembly reports of 
2011, 2015, and 2017 all highlighted Italy’s poor record; for instance, as of 31 December 2016, 
23.6% of all of the cases marked as pending by the CoM were from Italy – the highest 
proportion of pending cases from a single country.156 Over the past fifteen years since the 
Parliamentary Assembly has been monitoring the implementation of judgments, Italy has 
regularly been among the top five countries in terms of noncompliance, joined by Russia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and Romania.157 Italy is also one of the nine countries which the 
Parliamentary Assembly and Council of Ministers have criticized for being “chronically slow 
in implementation”: Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and 
Ukraine.158 
 Yet in this model, Italy is presented as following a pathway of compliance. In fact, it is 
the only country with a low WGI score to follow one of the pathways to compliance. This may 
be partly accounted for in that in the one case of Italy’s which was included in the dataset, 
which was related to children’s rights, Italy did comply. It would thus appear that, at least in 
relation to children’s rights, Italy is in a state of normative consensus with the ECHR and the 
CoE. It should also be noted, however, that the vast majority of cases which Italy brings are 
related to “excessive length of judicial proceedings and lack of an effective remedy in that 
regard; expulsion of foreign nationals in violation of the Convention; [and] poor conditions of 
detention.”159 These “endemic” issues have remained sources of concern for the Parliamentary 
Assembly, though in the 2017 report they noted that Italy had made marked progress in 
addressing human rights in prison and the expulsion of foreign nationals.160 
 Partly because of this persistent trend of noncompliance, Hillebrecht examined Italy as 
a case study in in her 2014 book. 161 She concluded that Italy’s attitude toward judgments from 
the ECtHR varies greatly depending on the type of case brought. For instance, in the case of 
Lautsi and Others v. Italy, involving a debate over the presence of crucifixes in public schools, 
“Italy showed more initiative and interest in tackling this case than it ever has for the thousands 
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of rule of law cases handed down by the European Court.”162 She argues that this demonstrates 
that political will is the driver of compliance, and that Italy’s slow implementation is due to a 
view of the rule of law cases as “little more than a nuisance.”163 
 I would argue that this reinforces my original argument that there is a lack of consensus 
on which norms are most important within the Council of Europe. Clearly if there is a lack of 
will to implement changes to the judicial system, then too the conviction that fair judicial 
proceedings are a priority is also lacking. However as I have focused this study on the norms 
of gender equality, children’s rights, and disability rights, I can only make conclusions based 
on the acceptance and consensus regarding these norms.  
 
Romania 
Romania’s relationship with the ECtHR is an issue of deep concern within the Council 
of Europe, as, similar to Italy, it has overall very low rates of compliance, a high number of 
cases brought each year, and a high number of repetitive cases.164 Most of the figures listed 
above regarding Italy’s low rate of implementation of ECtHR judgments are similar to those 
for Romania.  From my results, it would appear that Romania does demonstrate a level of 
normative consensus within cases related to 
gender equality and disability rights, but since 
the results of this study are necessarily 
limited, Romania’s overall relationship with 
the ECtHR is worth further investigation. 
Romania’s primary issues, according 
to the 2015 report, were “failure to restore or 
compensate for nationalized property; 
excessive length of judicial proceedings and 
lack of an effective remedy in that regard; 
non-enforcement of domestic judicial 
decisions; poor conditions of detention; and 
ill treatment by police and lack of effective 
investigations in this respect.”165 It is one of 
                                                 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippido 2014 
165 De Vries 2015 
 
Figure 5: Main States with cases under enhanced supervision 
(on the basis of the number of leading cases) as of 31 
December 2013 
Source: Committee of Ministers 2014, p. 61 
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the nine states which has been consistently listed by the CoM and Parliamentary Assembly as 
having the highest number of non-implemented judgments and persistent structural problems 
which have not been resolved despite being discussed for over ten years.166 According to the 
2017 report they have been making some progress, but Romania still accounts for 5% (the 7th 
most after Italy’s 6%) of the cases under “enhanced supervision.”167 These cases are those 
which are “the most complex and politically ‘sensitive,’” a denomination which has been 
increasing in number over the past five years.168 The 2013 statistics on countries with cases 
under enhanced supervision may be seen in Figure 5. This trend does not appear to be 
diminishing, as evidenced by a 108% rise in applications from Romania in 2016, underscoring 
Romania’s reputation as one of the worst human rights violators in the CoE.169 
The main issue which is typically discussed in relation to Romania’s human rights 
record is its treatment toward minority groups, specifically the Roma people. This was 
emphasized in the CoM’s 2015 report, where it noted that it was “increasingly confronted with 
difficulties related to ‘pockets of resistance’ linked to deeply-rooted problems of a social nature 
(for example toward Roma or certain minorities).”170  In Romania, this continuing mistreatment 
has sometimes been explained by the lack of organization and political representation of the 
Roma people. 171 Regardless of the reason, Romania clearly still has significant progress to be 
made toward protecting minority rights. 
It is remarkable that, despite being in compliance in the two cases included in this 
dataset, Romania still falls into the pathway of noncompliance, which does in fact correspond 
to the reality of Romania’s compliance record and relationship with the Court. This illustrates 
that there is a legitimate connection between the conditions examined and state’s likelihood to 
comply. It is likely that if a different set of norms had been selected for this study, Romania 
would not have been found to be in compliance. Therefore, this contradiction within the 
pathway toward noncompliance may be disregarded. This strengthens the findings that a lack 
of a strong WGI, a negative status as a founding member, and a low EEI score combine to form 
a strong predictor of noncompliance. 
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Switzerland 
 Unlike Italy and Romania, Switzerland is not commonly listed among the states which 
most struggle with compliance with ECtHR judgments. Its two cases of noncompliance in this 
dataset are therefore intriguing, particularly since they are present in two of the potential 
pathways toward compliance. Switzerland is not a founding member of the Council, having 
joined in 1963 “after extensive and heated discussions about the subject of neutrality.”172 Of 
the over 200 CoE agreements, Switzerland has ratified approximately half, and has 
incorporated them into their national law.173 However, they have been a persistent objector to 
the ECtHR’s expansion of their mandate in interpreting human rights law. Indeed, they have 
strongly advocated for a return to the “doctrine of national discretionary scope,” or in other 
words that the court, when examining the justification of interfering with a domestic legal 
position, should be mindful of the fact that “because of their knowledge of local circumstances, 
national authorities may often be better able to assess whether there was sufficient public 
interest in the case in question and whether this was relative.”174 Another example of this 
resistant attitude is the 2016 launching of a popular initiative by the UDC (the Swiss People’s 
Party or Democratic Union of the Centre) called “Swiss law instead of foreign judges.”175 In 
one of their many statements regarding the legitimacy of ECtHR judgments, the Swiss Centre 
of Expertise in Human Rights (SCHR or SKMR) argued that “the problem often lies not so 
much in the disregard of national discretion, but in the over-generous power of the Court to 
review and evaluate factual issues, and to derive standards from the ECHR, which can hardly 
be effectively justified by the provisions.”176 They are therefore often skeptical toward the 
reach of the Court interfering in their own human rights jurisdiction.  
This may be traced in the two cases of noncompliance in question. The first judgment 
dates back to 1994, for the case of Burghartz v. Switzerland, which relates to norms of gender 
equality.177 The Court ruled that Switzerland’s refusal to allow a husband to take his wife’s last 
name was discriminatory and revealed unequal treatment toward men and women.178 
Switzerland paid just satisfaction to the couple, but refused to change its laws, which had been 
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very explicitly designed in favor of a single joint name for all married couples.179 Thus as of 
the writing of this thesis, the Court still considers this judgment to be pending. The second 
case, Glor vs. Switzerland, is from 2009 and is related to disability rights. This was the first 
case in which the ECtHR applied Article 14 (prohibiting discrimination) of the ECHR to 
disability rights.180 This was in response to Switzerland denying an applicant for military 
service due to their disability, but still imposing taxes on them for not performing military 
service as Mr. Glor did not have a “major” disability.181 This “military service exemption tax” 
is a standard procedure in Switzerland aimed at creating “equality between those who did and 
did not undertake military service.”182 The applicant was also not allowed to carry out an 
alternate civil service which was available to conscientious objectors. Swiss authorities did not 
agree with the broad interpretation of “disability” which the Court adopted, and therefore while 
they reimbursed Mr. Glor for his legal fees and disseminated information on the case to the 
public,183 that was the extent to which they complied with the Court’s ruling. It should be noted 
that in the judgment, this is all the Court required of them; they did not provide any 
recommendations as to measures the state should take to resolve the situation. Yet the case is 
still marked as pending. 
Overall this demonstrates that although Switzerland does have a fairly good rate of 
compliance with ECtHR judgments, due to their unacceptance of the jurisdiction and 
interpretive legitimacy of the Court they value their own sovereignty over being in perfect 
consensus with the CoE. Like Italy, this demonstrates a prioritizing of certain norms over 
others; in this case, the norms at hand are not necessarily linked to human rights, but rather to 
state sovereignty. Further research into the priority given to different norms within Swiss 
government and society would be illustrative for this research question, but is deserving of a 
dedicated project in its own right. 
 
These three country cases, far from contradicting the validity of the pathways which 
this analysis identified, instead reinforce my hypothesis that a lack of normative consensus 
influences the likelihood of compliance, as in each of these cases there is an element of 
disagreement over the priority given to different norms of international relations and human 
rights law. They also emphasize the validity of my identification of conditions which could 
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make compliance more or less likely. In the next section I will discuss the potential implications 
of this analysis for the existing literature. 
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
This limited analysis is able to illustrate some of the interaction between different 
conditions and theories which was discussed at the outset of this thesis. In this section I will 
briefly revisit the arguments put forward by the two foremost authors on this topic and discuss 
how these findings correspond to their hypotheses. 
It appears that within EU member states, robust institutions as hypothesized by 
Hillebrecht do indeed matter. It is intriguing that a higher WGI score does not automatically 
correspond to compliance, and neither does a low WGI score. As presented in the table on 
necessary and sufficient conditions, the highest score which WGI received was 0.87 coverage 
score for a high WGI leading to compliance. Overall there was a general correspondence 
between WGI scores and the likelihood of compliance, with low WGI scores having a 
consistency of 0.82 within the pathways to noncompliance. It therefore does not have as 
significant of results as the EEI score, but it can be said to have some predictive ability. It may 
be, as previously discussed, that Hillebrecht’s study was biased toward the robustness of 
institutions by examining cases and obligations of non-repetition, which are closely linked to 
the ability of a state to make structural and legislative changes. However, clearly strong 
domestic institutions are still important, as evidenced by the fact that only one state, Italy, 
followed a pathway toward compliance despite having a low WGI score. 
In Von Staden’s large-n quantitative study, he found that there is a positive correlation 
between polity score and compliance rate, but its R2 was quite low at 0.336. In other words, 
“only about a third of the variation in compliance rates can be explained by a state’s polity 
score.”184  He also noted that there is great variation in compliance rates amongst countries 
who score a perfect 10 on the polity score, and that clearly there does not exist a perfect 
bivariate relationship between the two.185 Therefore the fact that it has had such a strong effect 
in this analysis, combined with the lack of variation in the variable (pre-calibration), does not 
necessarily support or undermine Von Staden’s theory. Rather it may point to the fact that in 
the Council of Europe there is not significant enough variation in whether or not countries 
qualify as liberal democracies for it to be a meaningful distinction. The qualities by which one 
is labeled a liberal democracy, such as the protection of individual rights and freedoms and 
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limitations on political power, may themselves be more meaningful to examine separately from 
this overarching moniker.186  
 The findings on the impact of being a founding member or not on a state’s likelihood 
of compliance were far more significant than expected. However, as one may recall from the 
section describing the theories behind this condition’s inclusion, whether or not a state is a 
founding member may also indicate how successful socialization into the set of norms 
propagated by the Convention has been. According to these results, it would appear that 
socialization has not been successful since even states which joined right afterward 
(Switzerland for instance) fail to comply with judgments related to well-established human 
rights norms. This may be linked to a lack of perceived legitimacy rather than a strict normative 
divide; regardless, however, it does not undermine my hypothesis that there is a lack of 
normative consensus. This only suggests that those countries which were not original members 
of the CoE’s normative scheme have not fully adhered to its values. Additionally, examining 
the countries which followed the different pathways, shown below in Figure 5, it is 
immediately apparent that the set of countries represented in this study’s pathways toward 
compliance (dark blue) and toward noncompliance (light blue) differ along a very clear line.  
 
                                                 
186 Oxford Dictionary 2018; according to Oxford Dictionaries, a liberal democracy is: “A democratic system of 
government in which individual rights and freedoms are officially recognized and protected, and the exercise of 
political power is limited by the rule of law.” 
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Figure 6: The East-West Divide by Pathway 
 
Source: Author-generated map from the compiled dataset 
It is clear from this map that, although the socialization or diffusion of norms may still be too 
abstract to measure, there does exist an East-West divide as was discussed at the beginning of 
this paper. Further research into what exactly comprises this divide is warranted as both 
policymakers and academics consider the future role and effectiveness of the Council of 
Europe.  
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LIMITATIONS 
 
This project is necessarily beset with numerous limitations, as it seeks to examine 
abstract conditions related to the nebulous concepts of norms and compliance. While I have 
attempted to mitigate these constraints as best as possible, I would like to take a moment to 
discuss the specific gaps which this project leaves for future researchers. 
Firstly, as previously discussed there is a fundamental weakness with utilizing either 
the Polity IV indicators or the categorization of liberal vs. non-liberal democracies when 
discussing the membership of the Council of Europe. As an institution which is seeking to unite 
two disparate halves of Europe, the CoE represents much more nuanced differences than those 
presented in these two broad categories, and their usage is bound to obscure rather than 
illustrate these distinctions. Within the CoE there exist well-established liberal democracies, 
young liberal democracies, new democracies working toward becoming liberal, and 
autocracies masquerading as autocracies. An application of fsQCA to a set of cases such as 
these might allow for the identification of the threshold at which the level of democratization 
has an impact, as it allows for calibrations between  1 and 0.187 Also for this reason, averages 
taken of the region are not entirely accurate, as several regular outliers such as Russia and 
Turkey tend to bring the averages for the entire membership down and indicate the presence of 
problems that might not otherwise be of concern to the rest of the Council. 
Secondly, this project is limited in that it is not joined by a large-n quantitative analysis 
to demonstrate overall trends. This study would be complemented by a comparison with the 
actual rates of compliance as compiled by Von Staden in his upcoming publication. 
Unfortunately this data has not yet been made public, so the entirety of our understanding of 
trends comes from his previously published working papers. However he has alluded to two 
factors which could be quite informative for this study in particular. He firstly noted that despite 
the popular assumption, not all Eastern bloc countries have low rates of compliance, and that 
in fact Slovenia, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic all have both high polity 
scores and high rates of compliance.188 Although as previously mentioned the Polity scores are 
lacking sufficient detail to illustrate the differences between member states, in this study the 
Czech Republic was a border case in both its WGI score and EEI score. Therefore its domestic 
environment and patterns of compliance deserve additional examination.  
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Von Staden also called our attention to another significant limitation for this project, 
which lies in that it largely ignores one of the most pressing trends within cases before the 
ECtHR: the existence of repetitive cases. Von Staden shares that 89% of the 9,941 cases 
marked as pending at the end of 2016 were repetitive cases, meaning their violations were the 
same as in a previous, un-implemented Court judgment.189 Further analysis of the selected 
cases could examine whether there is any difference in compliance pathways depending on 
whether or not a case is repetitive, and it could be that this is a missing intervening factor in 
predicting the likelihood of compliance. However, just saying that a state has a less likely 
chance of implementing a judgment if it is a repetitive case does not illustrate the state 
characteristics which are behind the likelihood of compliance, which has been my focus in this 
study. An alternate approach to that taken in this paper could be to examine the details of the 
individual cases. A QCA analysis with conditions more related to the elements of the case (for 
instance, involvement by a political party, whether a case is a repetitive case or not, the 
involvement of civil society in lobbying one way or other, etc.) could provide further detail to 
these patterns of compliance. There would then also be more variation in the dataset as the 
conditions would not be the same for each country. However as this thesis is interested in the 
question of whether there exists a normative consensus between states, it is appropriate to 
design the conditions to reflect each country’s characteristics. 
Thirdly, the exclusion of cases related specifically to rule of law does ignore one of the 
most worrying developments within Europe in recent years. In 2014, CoE secretary general 
Thorbjørn Jagland claimed that Europe was facing its worst rule of law crisis since the end of 
the Cold War.190 He identified the following challenges: “discrimination against ethnic and 
national minorities (in 39 member states); prison overcrowding (30 states); corruption (26 
states); ill treatment by police (23 states); social exclusion and discrimination against Roma 
(20 states); and restrictions of free expression (eight states).”191 This project does not seek to 
identify challenges with judicial corruption, but acknowledges the likelihood that this may be 
one of the biggest contributors to low rates of compliance in some countries. 
Fourthly, just as Hillebrecht’s case selection may have biased her findings toward the 
importance of institutions, so too I acknowledge that limiting my cases to those related to a set 
of specific human rights norms rather than those concerned with judicial effectiveness and rule 
of law may have biased my results toward the importance of normative consensus. Realistically 
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it is not possible to craft a dataset which would be both limited enough for this QCA analysis 
and also representative enough to include diversity in the countries represented and in the ratio 
of pending vs. closed cases. This highlights the fact that QCA is most effective in conjunction 
with other studies of a large-n quantitative or small-n case study approach, as it has a limited 
N to work with. The most effective study would be a large-n identifying trends, important 
conditions, and outliers, then using these to craft a QCA dataset, followed by intensive case 
studies on the contradictions which the pathways identify. This project has attempted to follow 
this approach in a fashion appropriately scaled for an MSc. thesis, but further development of 
this approach could illustrate the key conditions and patterns of compliance which are of utmost 
concern to policymakers and academics alike, and would be a valuable addition to the 
literature.  
Finally, this analysis only includes cases up until the end of 2012, and therefore has not 
taken into account recent activities particularly on the part of Russia which have demonstrated 
its hostility toward the Council and the rights enshrined in the ECHR. In 2014, for instance, its 
controversial annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine led to worsening relations within 
the CoE, UN, OSCE, etc192 In 2015, Russia ruled that its Constitutional Court could declare 
judgments from the ECtHR as contrary to their domestic laws and therefore not 
implementable.193 In connection to worsening relations in general between the East and 
Western halves of the European continent, the argument put forward here that there exists a 
normative divide appears intuitive. Yet for future research, this could be a point for excluding 
cases from Russia as it is a significant outlier both politically and socially. For this study, these 
political developments are important to keep in mind since their roots were likely in place 
during the selected period of time, and since the continued non-implementation of ECtHR 
judgments is certainly related to their dismissal of the Court’s legitimacy. Despite this 
consideration, the high consistency observed in the pathway toward noncompliance indicates 
that the removal of Russia from this study would not necessarily change the results. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, this thesis has attempted to answer the question of what conditions make 
compliance with judgments from the European Court of Human Rights more or less likely. In 
doing so it has also addressed the question of whether or not there is normative consensus in 
the Council of Europe, and hypothesized that a lack of domestic acceptance of human rights 
norms increases the likelihood of non-compliance. Through an application of qualitative 
comparative analysis to a dataset of 55 ECtHR cases from 23 countries, it appears that although 
domestic acceptance of norms might increase the likelihood of compliance when occurring in 
combination with other conditions, it is not in itself sufficient to predict compliance, or 
necessary for compliance to occur. However according to this model, those countries which 
are founding members of the CoE have a greatly increased likelihood of compliance, as well 
as those which are liberal democracies. 
From a policy-oriented perspective, there are a number of avenues for research which 
this thesis highlights, several of which have already been alluded to in the limitations section. 
Building on the results of this paper, a complementary study examining how voting patterns at 
the ECtHR have evolved in conjunction with the expansion of the CoE could provide further 
detail. Is there more dissention now that the Court is made up of judges from such diverse 
nations? Or as Voeten has observed, has the addition of judges from countries with poor human 
rights records only served to energize the Court into a more activist role?194 What implications 
might this have for the CoE’s mission to promote democracy, human rights, and rule of law?  
The results of this research may also be valuable for policymakers as they consider how 
to adapt the Court to better manage the influx of cases. In the past few years reforms at the 
Court have taken the attitude of streamlining the case selection process to manage the backlog; 
in practice, however, this has resulted in individuals with legitimate claims being turned away 
from the Court’s jurisdiction.195 Although reforms are always necessary, this study may 
highlight the need for measures aimed at addressing domestic conditions which increase the 
likelihood of noncompliance. For instance, the CoE could increase funding for projects aimed 
at promoting democracy and for NGO grants in countries which have low rates of compliance. 
Such an understanding of the motivations behind states’ noncompliance may allow the CoE to 
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expand its mission in ways both beneficial to the individual countries as well as to its own 
functioning. 
This discussion also has implications for analyzing the interaction between the EU and 
the Council of Europe. As a highly integrated regional organization whose membership 
comprises a subset of another, far more limited, regional organization, the EU may in effect 
promote the deepening of the normative divide. The EU has its own human rights treaty and 
judicial institution, which with its enforcement mechanisms is in many ways a more effective 
promoter of human rights than the CoE.196 It is unsurprising then that there would exist an 
accelerated liberalization and adoption of human rights norms within countries which are a part 
of the EU as opposed to those which are only members of the Council. The impact of inter-
integrative scheme relationships is a relatively new area of research as the global community 
has become increasingly saturated with intergovernmental organizations and regional 
integration bodies. In recent years policymakers at both the EU and CoE have sought to address 
the nature and depth of their cooperation; studies on the nature of the divide between and among 
their memberships may thus be informative for establishing their priorities. 
From an academic perspective, this thesis is one of the first attempts to quantify 
normative consensus and the domestic acceptance of international norms of human rights. If 
the EEI score is to be trusted as a proxy for socialization into the set of human rights norms 
previously discussed, then this analysis would suggest that this does not necessarily correspond 
with increased likelihood of compliance. Its predictive power, on the other hand, has been 
demonstrated to be quite effective. The study of civil society’s impact on the proliferation of 
human rights norms is one that has plenty of room for further development as the current wave 
of globalization leads to a more interconnected and empowered civil society. This 
operationalization of normative consensus may therefore have uses beyond the purposes of this 
paper. 
This thesis is necessarily only a starting point for a larger discussion and examination 
of the existence of a normative split in a fundamentally norm-based institution. It is not 
uncommon for international institutions to have a diversity of beliefs and practices represented 
amongst their membership. However most institutions are built upon the premise that diverse 
entities may forge cooperation on issues of mutual importance, such as trade, security, or 
settling disputes. For an institution such as the Council of Europe, which purposes to be a 
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regional entity enforcing certain accepted behaviors and norms, such a divide raises crucial 
questions on whether it is in fact an effective or legitimate organization.  
I am far from the first to ask such questions, and I anticipate these will continue to 
plague policymakers and academics in the coming years. Some argue that the expansion of the 
CoE in the 80s and 90s has changed the nature of the Council “from an organization 
encompassing fairly like-minded countries to one that admits states whose governments and 
polities arguably more closely resemble those in regions other than Western Europe."197 
Ultimately this project may, although it was not its aim, clearly illustrate the existence of the 
divide between the East and West, because of the countries listed under each pathway. 
However it remains to be seen whether it is legitimate to characterize this separation as a 
normative divide, or whether as the analysis demonstrated, it is simply a divide between 
founding members / liberal democracies and the later expansion of the Council.  
 
 
“Until 1989, the Convention could be described as an international control 
mechanism for fine-tuning sophisticated national democratic engines that were, on the whole, 
working well. Now, and in the foreseeable future, this is not a blanket assumption that can be 
made for many of the participating States that are starting out on the democratic path. The 
nature, not only the volume, of the cases submitted is liable to change.”198 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1A: Development in the number of cases pending at the end of the year, from 1996 to 
2013.  
 
Source: Committee of Ministers 2014, p. 34 
 
Table 1A: Raw Data  
Case Name Norm 
Pending 
or Closed WGIRoL LibDem 
Founding 
Member 
Yes=1, 
No=0 EEI 
Zeman v. Austria Gender Equality closed 1.85 Free 0 0.76 
Stagno v. Belgium 
Children's 
Rights 
closed 1.35 Free 1 0.75 
Stanev v. Bulgaria 
Disability 
Rights 
pending -0.07 Free 0 0.61 
A.K. and L. v. 
Croatia (no. 
37956/11) 
Disability 
Rights 
closed 0.14 Free 0 0.6 
Mikulić v. Croatia 
Children's 
Rights 
closed 0.14 Free 0 0.6 
Oršuš and Others v. 
Croatia 
Children's 
Rights 
closed 0.14 Free 0 0.6 
Đorđević v. Croatia 
Disability 
Rights 
pending 0.14 Free 0 0.6 
A. v. Croatia (no. 
55164/08) 
Gender Equality pending 0.14 Free 0 0.6 
D.H. and Others v. 
the Czech Republic 
Children's 
Rights 
pending 0.9590 Free 0 0.69 
Osman v. Denmark 
Children's 
Rights 
closed 1.93 Free 1 0.81 
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Case Name Norm 
Pending 
or Closed WGIRoL LibDem 
Founding 
Member 
Yes=1, 
No=0 EEI 
Vincent v. France 
Disability 
Rights 
closed 1.46 Free 1 0.72 
Mocie v. France 
Disability 
Rights 
closed 1.46 Free 1 0.72 
Koua Poirrez v. 
France 
Disability 
Rights 
closed 1.46 Free 1 0.72 
Draon v. France and 
Maurice v. France 
Disability 
Rights 
closed 1.46 Free 1 0.72 
Mazurek v. France 
Children's 
Rights 
closed 1.46 Free 1 0.72 
Kutzner v. Germany 
Disability 
Rights 
closed 1.70 Free 0 0.7 
Karlheinz Schmidt v. 
Germany 
Gender Equality closed 1.70 Free 0 0.7 
Brauer v. Germany 
Children's 
Rights 
pending 1.70 Free 0 0.7 
Z.H. v. Hungary (no. 
28973/11) 
Disability 
Rights 
pending 0.80 Free 0 0.69 
Alajos Kiss v. 
Hungary 
Disability 
Rights 
pending 0.80 Free 0 0.69 
Kjartan Ásmundsson 
v. Iceland 
Disability 
Rights 
closed 1.67 Free 0 0.79 
Godelli v. Italy 
Children's 
Rights 
closed 0.40 Free 1 0.63 
Jasinskis v. Latvia 
Disability 
Rights 
pending 0.40 Free 0 0.65 
D.D. v. Lithuania 
(no. 13469/06) 
Disability 
Rights 
pending 0.75 Free 0 0.65 
Mizzi v. Malta Gender Equality closed 1.46 Free 0 0.7 
Zarb Adami v. Malta Gender Equality closed 1.46 Free 0 0.7 
Genovese v. Malta 
Children's 
Rights 
pending 1.46 Free 0 0.7 
Sen v. the 
Netherlands 
Children's 
Rights 
closed 1.82 Free 1 0.79 
Camp and Bourimi v. 
the Netherlands 
Children's 
Rights 
closed 1.82 Free 1 0.79 
Van Raalte v. the 
Netherlands 
Gender Equality closed 1.82 Free 1 0.79 
Folgerø and Others 
v. Norway 
Children's 
Rights 
closed 1.94 Free 1 0.8 
R.R. v. Poland (no. 
27617/04) 
Disability 
Rights 
pending 0.60 Free 0 0.68 
A. M. M. v. Romania 
(no. 2151/10) 
Disability 
Rights 
closed -0.01 Free 0 0.59 
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Case Name Norm 
Pending 
or Closed WGIRoL LibDem 
Founding 
Member 
Yes=1, 
No=0 EEI 
Hulea v. Romania Gender Equality closed -0.01 Free 0 0.59 
Arutyunyan v. Russia 
Disability 
Rights 
pending -0.85 Not Free 0 0.45 
Shtukaturov v. Russia 
Disability 
Rights 
pending -0.85 Not Free 0 0.45 
Lashin v. Russia 
Disability 
Rights 
pending -0.85 Not Free 0 0.45 
Timishev v. Russia 
Children's 
Rights 
pending -0.85 Not Free 0 0.45 
Konstantin Markin v. 
Russia 
Gender Equality pending -0.85 Not Free 0 0.45 
Jäggi v. Switzerland 
Children's 
Rights 
closed 1.80 Free 0 0.79 
Schuler-Zgraggen v. 
Switzerland 
Gender Equality closed 1.80 Free 0 0.79 
Losonci Rose and 
Rose v. Switzerland 
Gender Equality closed 1.80 Free 0 0.79 
Glor v. Switzerland 
Disability 
Rights 
pending 1.80 Free 0 0.79 
Burghartz v. 
Switzerland 
Gender Equality pending 1.80 Free 0 0.79 
Cyprus v. Turkey 
Children's 
Rights 
pending 0.06 
Partly 
Free 
0 0.47 
Hasan and Eylem 
Zengin v. Turkey 
Children's 
Rights 
pending 0.06 
Partly 
Free 
0 0.47 
Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey Gender Equality pending 0.06 
Partly 
Free 
0 0.47 
Opuz v. Turkey Gender Equality pending 0.06 
Partly 
Free 
0 0.47 
Saviny v. Ukraine 
Disability 
Rights 
closed -0.78 Free 0 0.56 
Price v. the United 
Kingdom 
Disability 
Rights 
closed 1.75 Free 1 0.75 
H.L. v. the United 
Kingdom (no. 
45508/99) 
Disability 
Rights 
closed 1.75 Free 1 0.75 
Glass v. the United 
Kingdom 
Disability 
Rights 
closed 1.75 Free 1 0.75 
Willis v. the United 
Kingdom 
Gender Equality closed 1.75 Free 1 0.75 
Hobbs, Richard, 
Walsh and Geen v. 
the United Kingdom 
Gender Equality closed 1.75 Free 1 0.75 
Runkee and White v. 
the United Kingdom 
Gender Equality closed 1.75 Free 1 0.75 
 
P A G E  | 77 
 
 
Table 2A: QCA Truth Table 
CaseName Complianc
e 
WGIRo
L 
LibDe
m 
FoundMe
m 
EE
I 
ZemanvAustria 1 1 1 0 1 
StagnovBelgium 1 1 1 1 1 
StanevvBulgaria  0 0 1 0 0 
AKandLvCroatia 1 0 1 0 0 
MikulicvCroatia 1 0 1 0 0 
OrsusandOthersvCroatia 1 0 1 0 0 
DordevicvCroatia 0 0 1 0 0 
AvCroatia 0 0 1 0 0 
DHandOthersvtheCzechRepublic 0 0 1 0 0 
OsmanvDenmark 1 1 1 1 1 
VincentvFrance 1 1 1 1 1 
MocievFrance 1 1 1 1 1 
KouaPoirrezvFrance 1 1 1 1 1 
DraonvFranceandMauricevFran
ce 
1 1 1 1 1 
MazurekvFrance 1 1 1 1 1 
KutznervGermany 1 1 1 0 0 
KarlheinzSchmidtvGermany 1 1 1 0 0 
BrauervGermany 0 1 1 0 0 
ZHvHungary 0 0 1 0 0 
AlajosKissvHungary 0 0 1 0 0 
KjartanAsmundssonvIceland 1 1 1 0 1 
GodellivItaly 1 0 1 1 0 
JasinskisvLatvia 0 0 1 0 0 
DDvLithuania 0 0 1 0 0 
MizzivMalta 1 1 1 0 0 
ZarbAdamivMalta 1 1 1 0 0 
GenovesevMalta 0 1 1 0 0 
SenvNL 1 1 1 1 1 
CampandBourimivNL 1 1 1 1 1 
VanRaaltevNL 1 1 1 1 1 
FolgeroandOthersvNorway 1 1 1 1 1 
RRvPoland 0 0 1 0 0 
AMMvRomania 1 0 1 0 0 
HuleavRomania 1 0 1 0 0 
ArutyunyanvRussia 0 0 0 0 0 
ShtukaturovvRussia 0 0 0 0 0 
LashinvRussia 0 0 0 0 0 
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CaseName Complianc
e 
WGIRo
L 
LibDe
m 
FoundMe
m 
EE
I 
TimishevvRussia 0 0 0 0 0 
KonstantinMarkinvRussia 0 0 0 0 0 
JaggivSwitzerland 1 1 1 0 1 
SchulerZgraggenvSwitzerland 1 1 1 0 1 
LosonciRoseandRosevSwitzerlan
d 
1 1 1 0 1 
GlorvSwitzerland 0 1 1 0 1 
BurghartzvSwitzerland 0 1 1 0 1 
CyprusvTurkey 0 0 0 0 0 
HasanandEylemZenginvTurkey 0 0 0 0 0 
UnalTekelivTurkey 0 0 0 0 0 
OpuzvTurkey 0 0 0 0 0 
SavinyvUkraine 1 0 1 0 0 
PricevtheUK 1 1 1 1 1 
HLvtheUK 1 1 1 1 1 
GlassvtheUK 1 1 1 1 1 
WillisvtheUK 1 1 1 1 1 
HobbsRichardWalshGeenvtheUK 1 1 1 1 1 
RunkeeandWhitevtheUK 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 
